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Alternative Dispute Resolution and the





In recent years, the legal profession has become increasingly en-
chanted with nonjudicial dispute resolution mechanisms: negotiation,
conciliation, mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials, settlement, rent-a-judge,
and arbitration, among others.1 Although most, if not all, of these de-
vices have been with us for a long time, they have recently been applied
in innovative ways to new types of cases and have generated widespread
enthusiasm among lawyers, judges, legislators, and members of the gen-
eral public. The enthusiasm is not universally shared, however. Profes-
sor Owen Fiss of the Yale University School of Law is a major critic of
the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement. Although the prin-
cipal target of his 1984 article, Against Settlement,2 is, as its title sug-
gests, settlement itself, the article also decries, albeit less explicitly, all
processes that assist, induce, or compel parties to avoid judicial resolu-
tion of their legal disputes. Indeed, Professor Fiss appears to treat settle-
ment and ADR as roughly equivalent, or at least intimately related,
concepts. 3
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B. 1947,
City College of New York; J.D. 1960, University of California, Berkeley; LL.M. 1967, J.S.D.
1969, Columbia University.
1. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1985); L. KANOWITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1986); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUB-
LIC POLICY ISSUES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1983) [hereinafter NATIONAL INSTITUTE];
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668
(1986).
2. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
3. Id. Although there is considerable warrant for equating settlement and ADR as Pro-
fessor Fiss does, individual ADR devices differ in how they relate to settlement. Conciliation,
mediation, and fact-finding, for example, are mechanisms that assist parties to settle their own
disputes. Final and binding arbitration, by contrast, represents the imposition of a solution by
[2391
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Settlement, according to Professor Fiss,
is the civil analogue of plea bargaining. Consent is often coerced; the
bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a
trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement trouble-
some; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.
Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of
mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.4
Professor Fiss' criticism of settlement and ADR appears to rest on
three fundamental grounds: (1) his perception of potential conflicts be-
tween public and private interests in the private resolution of disputes
that are otherwise amenable to judicial resolution;5 (2) his apparent belief
in the ability of courts to render more or better justice than can be ob-
tained through private dispute resolution mechanisms; and (3) his view
that adjudication has broader purposes than the achievement of peace
between the disputing parties.
With his usual eloquence, Professor Fiss states his central thesis as
follows:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which
the public participates. These officials, like members of the legislative
and executive branches, possess a power that has been defined and con-
ferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their job is not to max-
imize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts
such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them. This duty is not discharged when
the parties settle.6
Although Professor Fiss does not expressly mention arbitration in
his critique of ADR, it is clear that it is not excluded from the range of
his criticism. 7 However, he does not examine any arbitration cases for
the light they might shed on his central thesis. The major purpose of this
a third party. In this respect, arbitration resembles judicial dispute resolution to some extent.
At the same time, arbitration shares a basic characteristic of settlement and other alternative
dispute resolution devices: Parties who submit their disputes to arbitration effectively delegate
to private persons the authority to settle those disputes. Courts have relied on this feature of
arbitration to permit postdispute arbitration of claims that would not have been subject to
predispute waiver of the right to a judicial tribunal. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
4. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1075.
5. Implicit, although not expressed, in Professor Fiss' preference for adjudication over
settlement and other nonjudicial dispute resolution mechanisms is the assumption that the
disputed matter is capable of judicial resolution. Even with regard to disputes that are not
subject to judicial resolution, however, the decision to employ alternative dispute resolution
techniques can significantly affect public interests. See infra Sections III, VIII.
6. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1085.
7. In Against Settlement, Professor Fiss specifically mentions "negotiation and media-
tion prior to suit." Id. at 1073. Although he does not expressly discuss arbitration in his 1984
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Article is to examine what courts have said and continue to say about
arbitration for the light such statements can shed on the relative capacity
of nonjudicial and traditional judicial dispute resolution processes to
serve public interests.
As will be more fully discussed below, judicial pronouncements in
arbitration cases yield useful insights into the alleged "public interest"
shortcomings-and strengths-of all alternative dispute resolution de-
vices. One such insight is that the term "public interest" is open to mul-
tiple definitions; its meaning will differ with the context in which, and
the purpose for which, it is used. Another is that in determining how
disputes should be resolved, public interests need not always transcend
private interests; stated differently, and somewhat paradoxically, public
interests are often best served by dispute resolution devices which appear
to satisfy only the concerns of the disputing parties. Still another is that
courts (including the United States Supreme Court) often acknowledge
the tension between private and public interests in arbitration cases; they
article, he has more recently dealt with it in explicit terms in a letter published in the March
17, 1986 issue of the Connecticut Law Tribune, wherein he writes:
The methods of ADR do not generate the social power or remedies sometimes
needed to deal with a recalcitrant reality. This is obviously the case when the resolu-
tion is dependent on the consent of both parties, as in negotiation and mediation, but
it is also true with a third-party ADR process like arbitration. The third party envi-
sioned by the ADR is, by definition, not a judge, and therefore, does not have the
coercive machinery of the state at his disposal; he does not have the public visibility
and respect of a judge; and perhaps most importantly, his judgment is not based on
the factual and legal inquiries that typify the exercise of the judicial power.
The third-party methods of ADR that eventuate in a judgment include the pres-
entation of the facts and the law-a trial-but that trial is markedly less thorough
and far-reaching than a judicial one. In some cases, it is also less structured or for-
mal. This is obviously so with minitrials or summary jury trials, as the labels imply,
but it is also true of more standard third-party ADR methods such as arbitration;
that is a principal source of their attractiveness. And although something is gained
from the informality and brevity (namely, money), something is also lost; the norma-
tive power that is generated by a process that is deliberate and meticulous....
Some of the other methods of ADR aspire to something more than peace. Here
I am thinking of arbitration, which seeks not simply to resolve a dispute but to re-
solve it justly. For that reason there is a greater similarity between arbitration and
adjudication than between negotiation or mediation and adjudication, and yet, there
is still a gap. Arbitration, like all the ADR methods, is essentially private in its
structure and its aims, and thus cannot be understood as a full substitute for adjudi-
cation. The arbitrator is chosen and paid for by the parties and his jurisdiction is
determined by an agreement between the parties. The norms of the arbitrator are
either supplied by the parties (for example, in a contract) or are derived from local-
ized practices or custom. And the arbitrator is only to apply or construe the norms;
he is not to create new ones.
Fiss, Second-Class Justice, Conn. Law Tribune, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, 10.
have, however, devised assorted techniques and justifications for favoring
one rather than the other in specific situations. Conflicting public poli-
cies are often implicated in the use of particular alternative dispute reso-
lution devices. In such cases, courts identify the relevant policies, weigh
one against the other, and decide which is to prevail. Finally, neither
judicial nor alternative dispute resolution devices (including arbitration)
are flawless; each method has strengths and weaknesses and choosing one
over another inevitably requires trade-offs, calculations of relative costs
and benefits, and a variety of value judgments.
II. The Aim and Purpose of Professor Fiss' Criticisms
As a preliminary matter one should note that, regardless of whether
adjudication actually serves the public interest better than settlement or
other forms of alternative dispute resolution, the vast majority of civil
and criminal cases are disposed of by settlement rather than by litiga-
tion. 8 The widespread use of settlement and alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms appears, therefore, to respond to a felt need on the part
of disputants. Whether their purpose is to avoid the cost, delay, complex-
ity, uncertainty, or anxiety of adjudication, disputants commonly resolve
their conflicts in ways other than a full-blown trial. Clearly, there are
social as well as personal advantages in avoiding litigation. Were every
potentially litigable dispute actually submitted to a full judicial trial,
present adjudicatory resources-judges, courthouses, bailiffs, etc.-
would have to be augmented exponentially.
To extol the virtues of adjudication over settlement and ADR, as
Professor Fiss does, is not likely to have much effect on those who are
inclined to avoid trial. It is doubtful, then, that, in arguing against settle-
ment and ADR, Professor Fiss was seeking to change the conduct of
disputants or their attorneys. Attempting to do so would have been like
arguing against unpleasant but unavoidable natural phenomena, such as
death, fire, flood, and pestilence. Rather, despite the general nature of
his attack, Professor Fiss' arguments appear to be addressed to other
constituencies.
One apparent target of his remarks was the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in 1983 recommended revi-
sion of Rule 68 to increase the penalty against litigants who, though pre-
vailing in court, do not receive awards higher than their opponents'
8. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 7; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten-
tious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 27-28 (1983).
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settlement offers. 9 The effect of Rule 68's proposed revision would have
been to force parties to attempt to settle their legal disputes, rather than
permitting them to pursue judicial determination.
Another probable target was the then recent revision of Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which encouraged pretrial consid-
eration of and action on "the possibility of settlement or the use of extra-
judicial procedures to resolve the dispute." Even under the earlier
version of Rule 16, federal judges had played an increasingly interven-
tionist role in pressuring parties to forego judicial resolution of their dis-
putes and instead to pursue settlement efforts, either through direct
negotiations, referral to mediators, or the holding of "summary trials" in
which a "jury" is asked to render a nonbinding verdict after hearing a
truncated version of each side's evidence and arguments. 10
Professor Fiss' criticisms could also have been directed at federal
and state judges and legislators who, in his opinion, have been seduced by
the alleged benefits of settlement and ADR. His article seeks to remind
them that before disputants are nudged or compelled into abandoning
their right to have their disputes decided by publicly accountable judges,
the costs and benefits of alternative devices should be calculated. Indeed,
as he notes in his article, "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of
mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised."11
These intended audiences have been influenced to a considerable ex-
tent by the criticisms of settlement and ADR. As a result, in their arbi-
tration decisions, they have been increasingly forced to reckon with the
insights provided by Professor Fiss and other critics of ADR.12
9. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1074 & n.7 (citing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-63 (1983)).
10. See generally Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. Rlv. 374 (1982).
11. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1073, 1075. As indicated earlier, Professor Fiss maintains simi-
lar views about other forms of ADR. See supra note 7.
12. See, eg., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986). In
upholding an arbitration award in favor of a wholesaler against a brewer, the court noted:
Counsel for Schlitz has suggested to us that if the appellate courts are in effect
unwilling to provide the same review of an arbitration proceeding as is given to a
judgment of a district court, that commercial arbitration will cease and the courts
will be further inundated with more litigation. Such threats should scare no one.
Certainly it should not intimidate the federal judiciary who presently are doing all
they can humanly do to maintain the judicial process as expeditious and just. Such
comments need to be made, however, for parties to the arbitration process to realize
that it is not the most perfect alternative to adjudication. The present day penchant
for arbitration may obscure for many parties who do not have the benefit of hindsight
that the arbitration system is an inferior system of justice, structured without due
process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law. The mere
fact that arbitration is deemed highly successful in labor disputes overlooks the rea-
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IH. Disputes that Are not Amenable to Judicial Resolution:
"Interests" Disputes vs. "Rights" Disputes
Professor Fiss and others who assert that courts serve public inter-
ests better than do private dispute mechanisms generally focus on ex-
isting, legal disputes. It is important to recall, however, that many
disputes are not prone to judicial resolution. For example, Article III of
the United States Constitution limits the federal judicial power to cer-
tain "Cases" or "Controversies," 13 and federal courts will not entertain
suits involving "political questions," 14 or render "advisory opinions." 15
Among other things, the latter prohibition means that federal courts lack
jurisdiction if a difference of opinion between parties has not ripened into
a live controversy 6 or has become moot.' 7 Similarly, federal courts will
son for its legitimacy: that it substitutes for labor's right to strike in a quid pro quo
exchange with management. No one ever deemed arbitration successful in labor con-
flicts because of its superior brand of justice.
We write this response not to denigrate the use of arbitration in commercial
transactions. We write only to provide notice that where arbitration is contemplated
the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given to structured
judgments defined by procedural rules and legal principles. Parties should be aware
that they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is far different from adjudica-
tion. Professor Owen Fiss provides the realism overlooked by many when he writes:
Adjudication is more likely to do justice than conversation, mediation, arbi-
tration, settlement, rent-a-judge, mini-trials, community moots or any other
contrivance of ADR, precisely because it vests the power of the state in
officials who act as trustees for the public, who are highly visible, and who
are committed to reason. What we need at the moment is not another as-
sault on this form of public power, whether from the periphery or the
center, or whether inspired by religion or politics, but a renewed apprecia-
tion of all that it promises.
Id. at 751 n.12 (quoting Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985)).
13. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States;-- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). This limitation on federal judicial power
sometimes occurs in combination with, or exclusively because of, "prudential" considerations.
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1974); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255
(1953).
14. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-49 (1969).
15. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("As is well known,
the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advi-
sory opinions.").
16. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972).
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refuse to entertain a suit by a person who lacks "standing" to complain
of the defendant's alleged conduct. 18 Although not bound by Article III,
state courts often observe similar standards. 19
For related reasons, "interests" disputes, as opposed to "rights" dis-
putes, are also not amenable to judicial resolution in either state or fed-
eral courts. The distinction between interests disputes and rights
disputes is similar to the difference between "interests" and "rights" arbi-
tration, which I have described elsewhere as follows:
In "interests" arbitration, the parties do not claim rights under an ex-
isting contract or law; instead, they seek to establish the terms of a
contract, have reached an impasse in their efforts to do so, and either
voluntarily or, in some cases, under compulsion of law, resort to a
third-party arbitrator to, in effect, fill in those terms for them. By con-
trast, in "rights" arbitration, one or both parties are relying upon the
terms of an existing contract between them, or upon "rights" conferred
by law. Because a disagreement has arisen concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of those contractual terms, or whether other legally
conferred rights have been violated, resort may be had to a third-party
arbitrator who, normally, is authorized to render a final and binding
determination of the dispute.20
Thus, if A offers B $100,000 for B's house, but B refuses to sell
unless A agrees to pay $150,000, a dispute exists between A and B. No
court, however, would venture to determine the appropriate price for the
17. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curian).
18. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973), and cases cited therein.
19. See, e.g., Spindulys v. Los Angeles Olympic Org. Comm., 175 Cal. App. 3d 206, 210,
220 Cal. Rptr. 565, 567 (1985) (action to enjoin Olympic Committee to permit association to
march in opening ceremonies of Olympics presented nonjusticiable political questions); Nye v.
Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 502 A.2d 869 (1985) (foster parents lacked standing to file a writ of
habeas corpus to determine custody of a minor child).
In Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or. 446, 648 P.2d 1289 (1982), the Oregon Supreme
Court stated:
In order for a court to entertain an action for declaratory relief, the complaint must
present a justiciable controversy. Justiciability is a vague standard but entails several
definite considerations. A controversy is justiciable, as opposed to abstract, where
there is an actual and substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal
interests. The controversy must involve present facts as opposed to a dispute which
is based on future events of a hypothethical issue. A justiciable controversy results in
specific relief through a binding decree as opposed to an advisory opinion which is
binding on no one. The court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a nonjusticiable con-
troversy because in the absence of constitutional authority, the court cannot render
advisory opinions.
Id. at 449, 648 P.2d at 1292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Some state constitutions, however do authorize the rendition of advisory opinions to des-
ignated state bodies and officials. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3,
art. II; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXIV.
20. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 1, at 39.
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property. The A-B conflict is a prototypical "interests" dispute, in which
the parties are trying to establish a legal relationship.
By contrast, if, having complied with all legal requirements, A and B
had previously agreed that A would pay $150,000 for the property, but A
now insists that he will pay only $100,000, a court would ordinarily en-
tertain the case if B sued for specific performance or damages. In such a
case, B would be asserting his rights under a contract, rights expressly
protected by statute or the common law. Because this is a "rights" dis-
pute, judicial resolution would be possible, absent other impediments to
judicial jurisdiction.21
A preliminary question, then, is whether the tension between public
and private interests can be meaningfully addressed in interests disputes.
Because such disputes are nonjusticiable, the choice is clearly not be-
tween nonjudicial and judicial resolution. Nevertheless, public interests
can play a significant role even in such situations.
Among other areas, this principle can be observed in federal and
state labor relations statutes which require employers and unions repre-
senting majorities of their employees in appropriate bargaining units to
bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.22 While such statutes do not compel particular resolu-
tions of underlying disputes,2 3 or even require that they be resolved at all,
they impose a positive, legally enforceable bargaining duty upon the par-
21. Another type of "rights" dispute which superficially resembles an "interests" dispute
can sometimes be seen in condemnation cases: Suppose the city in which B's house is located
decides to acquire the property for a public purpose. The city offers B $100,000 for it, but B
insists that he will not accept less than $150,000. The city then exercises its power of eminent
domain and brings an action to condemn the property. The court must, among other things,
determine the true market value of the property. At first blush, it appears that the parties have
merely reached an impasse in negotiating a purchase price for the property (a pure "interests"
dispute). Upon closer examination, however, the "rights" nature of this dispute becomes ap-
parent. Here, although price is in dispute, the more fundamental issues ultimately derive from
"rights" under the fifth amendment's prohibition against a governmental "taking" without just
compensation.
22. See, e.g., N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
23. See, e.g., id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), which provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
Id.; see also NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 405 (1952) (NLRB may not
compel concessions or otherwise adjudicate substantive terms of collective-bargaining
agreements.).
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ties. In contrast to the contemplated sale of B's property, described
above, where neither A nor B would violate any law by refusing to nego-
tiate about it, an employer or a union that violated its statutory bargain-
ing duty would incur legal sanctions. 24
The availability of legal sanctions against employers or unions who
violate a legally imposed bargaining duty (Le., a duty to try to settle a
dispute) reflects important public interests. Under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), for example, an obvious interest is that of equal-
izing the bargaining power between individual employees and their em-
ployers, in order to protect employees' purchasing power and thus
strengthen the national economy. 25 The NLRA also preserves unob-
structed channels of interstate commerce by remedying the former ab-
sence of a legally enforceable bargaining duty, an absence that had led to
disruptive strikes. 26
To be sure, the Congress that enacted and amended the NLRA did
so pursuant to what Professor Fiss describes, when referring to courts, as
"a power that has been defined and conferred by public law, not by pri-
vate agreement."' 27 In this respect, the bargaining duty imposed by the
NLRA reflects values that have been formulated by public officials,
24. The duty to bargain in good faith may require an employer to furnish a union with
information about its finances when the employer pleads an inability to meet the union's bar-
gaining demands. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956). Further, an employer
will be held to have committed a per se refusal to bargain by unilaterally changing a term or
condition of employment that is a mandatory bargaining subject. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 738-39 (1962).
25. See, eg., N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), entitled "Findings and Policies,"
which states:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in
the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and af-
fects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
26. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1936).
27. See supra text accompanying note 6. In the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), Congress also encouraged, without requiring, private resolution of "rights" or
"grievance" disputes. Section 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982), provides: "Fi-
nal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement." By contrast, under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-181 (1982), "minor" disputes (ie., "rights" or "grievance" disputes), as opposed to
"major" disputes (i.e., "interests" disputes) must be arbitrated if arbitration is requested by
any party to the dispute, Id. § 153. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 33-35 (1957).
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rather than private parties.28 Moreover, it is significant that the choice
Congress faced in enacting the NLRA was not between negotiation and
adjudication, but rather between negotiation and what might be called
the "right" not to negotiate.
Protection of the right not to negotiate, however, risks engendering
socially destructive economic warfare: strikes, boycotts, and lockouts.
Although these weapons are normally available to unions and employ-
ers,29 they are less likely to be employed if good faith negotiations are in
progress. With or without the assistance of third parties, negotiations,
after all, hold out a possibility that the parties' underlying dispute can
somehow be resolved. On the other hand, unions, employers, and em-
ployees who resort to economic weapons can themselves incur major fi-
nancial and other harm as a result of such activities. An employer who
locks out employees to pressure them to accept the employer's bargain-
ing position risks the permanent loss of customers who will take their
business to other employers during the lockout, not to speak of the loss
of profits caused by the production interruption. Striking employees suf-
fer immediate wage losses, which are not likely to be offset by strike ben-
efits or future overtime work opportunities. Unions may lose members if
a strike does not succeed. In the light of the potential for such drastic
consequences to those who resort to economic weapons in an effort to
prevail in an employer-employee dispute, the conclusion is inescapable
that the NLRA's imposition upon covered employers and unions of a
duty to attempt to settle their dispute reduces the number and scope of
28. Constitutional principles may be violated when a legislature imposes a duty to adopt
an "alternative" dispute resolution device that is not intended to be a substitute for adjudica-
tion. Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 254-58,
231 N.W.2d 226, 234-36 (1975). In Dearborn, two of the four members of the Michigan
Supreme Court who heard the case held that a state statute providing for compulsory arbitra-
tion of police and fire department labor "interest" disputes represented an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative-political power to private, politically unaccountable decision-makers.
Id. at 241-42, 231 N.W.2d at 228. Accord Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters
Local 1645, 563 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1977). Contra Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 192, 255
A.2d 560, 564 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109,
112-13, 256 A.2d 206, 208-09 (1969); State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 301-02 (Wyo.
1968). Dearborn is examined in greater detail in Section VIII of this Article.
29. However, under NLRA § 8(d), no party to an existing collective-bargaining contract
may terminate or modify the contract unless it notifies the other party in writing 60 days
before its expiration date or, if the contract contains no expiration date, 60 days before the date
of the proposed termination or modification. Section 8(d)(4) also requires that the party desir-
ing termination or modification must continue to observe "in full force and effect, without
resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period
of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later. " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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socially disruptive economic disturbances30-- disturbances that would
not only affect the immediate parties but that could have a profound
impact on the well-being of the nation, or at least a local or state com-
munity. In other words, although such quarrels may involve only a lim-
ited number of immediate participants, they can drastically affect larger
public interests.
These principles bear on the public versus private interest dichot-
omy in which the choice, at least in part, is between settlement (or other
forms of ADR) and adjudication. The fact is that, despite the pendency
of a judicial proceeding, disputing parties can inflict extra-judicial harm
on one another in many situations-not necessarily to influence the out-
come of their quarrel, but as an extension of their conflict. The infliction
of that harm can strongly implicate public interests.
In a marriage dissolution proceeding, for example, how a court re-
solves a dispute over the custody of a minor child can have important
consequences not only for the parents and the child, but for society at
large. A parent, disgruntled at the outcome of a custody issue, can direct
his or her displeasure at the child in ways that are difficult to detect, but
which can cause the child to suffer in its development, and eventually to
engage in behavior that could injure large numbers of other people. If a
conciliated or mediated settlement of the custody issue, approved by a
court, produces greater post-marital harmony between the former
spouses and between them and the child or children who were the objects
of the custody dispute-as the proponents of such settlements suggest-
are not public interests better served than if the matter had been deter-
mined solely by a court?
In an intercorporate dispute over an alleged patent infringement,
does not society benefit from a negotiated settlement, whether resulting
from face-to-face negotiations, mediation, or a mini-trial, in ways that it
would not if the matter were fully litigated? Do not negotiated settle-
ments free corporate managers from the distractions of pending law
suits, so they can devote their full energies to the management of the
enterprise, presumably for the benefit of shareholders, employees, and
the general public?
Examples can be multiplied. The point is that, just as in "interests"
30. Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of
employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for
the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace.
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife.
This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper
subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1936).
disputes, where a policy favoring negotiated settlements can be seen to
bestow important public benefits, similar policies with respect to "rights"
disputes can often yield similar benefits to the general public while serv-
ing the private interests of the disputing parties.
IV. Public vs. Private Interests in Arbitration
In arbitration cases, the tension between public and private interests
can arise in different contexts. One is in deciding whether disputing par-
ties should be allowed to submit their legal disputes to private arbitrators
in the first place. Despite the current hospitable attitude of courts and
legislatures toward arbitration, courts will customarily ask whether
something about the parties' particular dispute cautions against permit-
ting them to choose private rather than public adjudicators; that is,
would allowing them such a choice be consistent with public policy?
Public policy issues also arise in the context of judicial review of
arbitration awards. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)31 and state arbi-
tration statutes generally describe only narrow, technical grounds for ju-
dicial refusal to enforce arbitration awards. Nevertheless, in many
situations courts deny enforcement or vacate an award because, in the
court's view, the award violates one or another important public policy.3 2
The public policy issues in this context can assume diverse forms.
Should the award be vacated because the arbitrator has granted a rem-
edy, such as punitive damages, that public policy declares is beyond the
power of arbitrators to award?33 Has the arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded applicable legal doctrine?34 Did the arbitration hearing comply
with statutorily prescribed standards? 35 Did a union, which represented
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
32. See Comment, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw.
U.L. REv. 545 (1963).
33. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359-60, 353 N.E.2d 793, 796-97,
386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-35 (1976). But see Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l,
Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 364-65 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (federal policy does not preclude parties from
vesting arbitration panel with power to award punitive damages); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal.
App. 3d 618, 629-31, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 683-84 (1984) (upholding punitive damage award
because both parties consented to the remedy and the award could have been made by a court
of law).
For a discussion of the possible creation of a federal interpretation of the FAA that would
permit arbitrators to award punitive damages, and which would be binding on state courts in
cases covered by the FAA, see infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
34. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.,
469 F.2d 1211, 1214-16 (2d Cir. 1972) (arbitration awards will be set aside only for "manifest
disregard" of legal standards, and not for mere mistaken interpretation of law).
35. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,
149-50 (1968).
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a grievant in arbitration, violate its duty of fair representation by exclud-
ing the grievant from the hearing?36
Public interest considerations can also arise in deciding what, if any,
preclusive effect a court is to accord an arbitration award that is pleaded
in a subsequent statutory or common-law cause of action based upon the
same underlying facts as those involved in the arbitration proceeding.
For example, if a purchaser of securities unsuccessfully arbitrates a state
law claim that she has been defrauded by the seller, would--or should-
the purchaser be bound in a subsequent judicial proceeding by the arbi-
trator's earlier fact determinations? 37 If a collective bargaining agree-
ment prohibits an employer from discriminating against its employees on
racial grounds, what effect, if any, should an arbitrator's ruling that the
employee was discharged solely for malperformance have on the em-
ployee's right to seek a judicial remedy under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act for race-based employment discrimination?38
The diverse settings in which public interest considerations can
enter into the arbitral process give courts great flexibility in resolving
conflicts between private and public interests. In weighing public versus
private interests, courts can and have accorded separate treatment to var-
ious phases of the arbitration process. Courts can, for example, decide
that public policy would be violated if a particular type of dispute were
arbitrated. They can also decide that, although no public policy reasons
prevent the arbitration of a particular issue, the resulting award violates
one or more public policies. In such situations, if a court has lingering
doubts about its conclusion that a subject was arbitrable, it can ensure
that public interest considerations are not slighted by subjecting the
award to a heightened level of judicial review.39 It is also possible for a
court to say or imply that the public interest is well served by allowing a
particular case to be arbitrated in the first place, as well as by enforcing
the award, but to hold that other public interests may require that the
award not preclude judicial proceedings based on similar facts.
A. Historical Judicial Antagonism Towards Arbitration
Agreements to arbitrate future disputes historically have met with
36. See Dernings v. City of Ecorse, 127 Mich. App. 608, 339 N.W.2d 498 (1983), modi-
fied, 423 Mich. 49, 377 N.W.2d 275 (1985).
37. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1243-44 (1985), discussed
infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
38. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38, 59-60 (1974), discussed infra
note 103 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 108-10, 477 A.2d 1257, 1262-63 (1984).
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judicial hostility.4° In the past, although courts generally enforced arbi-
trators' awards, they refused to grant specific enforcement of executory
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, or to stay judicial proceedings
that were instituted in breach of such agreements.41 While many of the
reasons advanced by judges for these policies have been harshly criti-
cized, some may have been less irrational and more principled than we
have been led to believe. For example, courts often invoked what some
have regarded as a meaningless justification that disputing parties could
not be permitted to "oust" the courts of their jurisdiction.42 At first
blush, this reason appears to conflict with those same courts' willingness
to enforce awards once they had been rendered. It is not unreasonable to
suggest, however, that the oft-repeated admonition against permitting
disputants to oust the courts of their jurisdiction represented a short-
hand, if somewhat unrefined, expression of the kinds of concerns ex-
pressed by Professor Fiss-namely, that settlement and ADR prevent
judges from performing their duty to interpret and implement the values
embodied in constitutions, statutes, and other authoritative texts.43
40. The history of, rationale for, and commentary on this hostility are thoroughly ex-
amined in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
41. Id. at 982-84.
42. United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1009
(S.D.N.Y. 1915). Lord Campbell explained the hostility of the English courts to arbitration as
follows:
The doctrine had its origin in the interests of the judges. There was no disguising the
fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of the Judges depended mainly, or almost
entirely, upon fees, and as they had no fixed salaries, there was great competition to
get as much as possible of litigation into Westminster Hall, and a great scramble in
Westminster Hall for the division of the spoil .... And they had great jealousy of
arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was robbed of those cases which came not
into Kings Bench, nor the Common Pleas, nor the Exchequer. Therefore, they said
that the courts ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction, and that it was contrary
to the policy of the law to do so. That really grew up only subsequently to the time
of Lord Coke, and a saying of his was the foundation of the doctrine.
Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308, 313 (H.L. 1856), quoted in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 n.14 (2d Cir. 1942). Commenting on Lord Campbell's ex-
planation, the Second Circuit noted: "Indignation has been voiced at this supposition; perhaps
it is unwarranted. Perhaps the true explanation is the hypnotic power of the phrase 'oust the
jurisdiction.' Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as its bark."
Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84 (footnotes omitted).
43. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1085. The willingness of earlier courts to enforce covenants not
to sue, while refusing to enforce executory arbitration agreements, does not contradict the
hypothesis advanced in the text. A covenant not to sue has been defined as "a covenant by one
who had a right of action at the time of making it against another person, by which he agrees
not to sue to enforce such right of action." Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar, 10 F.2d 335,
337 (9th Cir. 1926). Because the right of action already exists, judicial recognition of a cove-
nant not to sue is functionally similar to recognition of an arbitration award. Moreover, it is
one thing for courts to say that a person may waive whatever rights he or she has against
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The distinction between enforcement of executory agreements to ar-
bitrate future disputes and enforcement of arbitration awards may also
have been more logical than earlier critics suggested. Analogous distinc-
tions have been drawn by contemporary courts even under modem arbi-
tration statutes which specifically validate agreements to arbitrate future
disputes. For example, in Wilko v. SwanA4 a customer sued a securities
brokerage firm for damages under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933.45 The firm and the customer had agreed to refer future disputes to
arbitration, and the Federal Arbitration Act provided that such an agree-
ment "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '46
The FAA also required a federal court to stay a suit or judicial proceed-
ing upon the application of a party if the court is "satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under" a
written agreement.47 Notwithstanding the FAA, the Supreme Court held
that the agreement to arbitrate violated the policy expressed in section 14
of the Securities Act. That policy declared void "[a]ny condition, stipu-
lation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision" of the Securities Act.48 The provisions
that the Wilko Court believed had been waived by the arbitration agree-
ment included section 12(2) itself, which created "a special right to re-
cover for misrepresentation which differ[ed] substantially from the
common-law action," as well as section 22, which allowed suit in any
state or federal court of competent jurisdiction and provided for nation-
wide service of process. 49 Because the agreement to arbitrate contravened
the policies of the Securities Act, the Court held that the firm's motion to
stay the trial should have been denied, notwithstanding the FAA's provi-
sion requiring a stay.
The Court's refusal to honor the arbitration agreement in Wilko did
not mean, however, that it would not have honored an arbitration award
had the plaintiff pursued arbitration in compliance with the agreement.
The Court stressed that "[b]y the terms of the agreement to arbitrate,
petitioner is restricted in his choice of forum prior to the existence of a
controversy. While the Securities Act does not require petitioner to sue,
another. It is quite another to say that that person may entrust the definition of those rights to
nonjudicial persons or entities.
44. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
46. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
47. Id. § 3.
48. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-38 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77n).
49. Id. at 431-33 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77v(a)).
a waiver in advance of a controversy stands upon a different footing." 50
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Jackson expressly suggested that
present, as opposed to future, Securities Act controversies were
arbitrable.51
In light of the distinction between existing and future controversies,
courts in subsequent cases have upheld arbitration awards encompassing
claims that were otherwise covered by the Securities Acts52 by distin-
guishing a postcontroversy submission from the precontroversy waiver in
Wilko.53 Thus, not unlike their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
counterparts, even modem courts armed with the insights of contempo-
rary arbitration statutes often distinguish between honoring executory
agreements to arbitrate future disputes and enforcing arbitration awards
determining disputes that arose prior to their submission.54
The former judicial hostility toward arbitration reflected quality-of-
justice concerns that resemble those expressed in Professor Fiss' current
criticism of settlement and ADR.55 Thus, in 1845, Judge Story offered,
among other arguments, the observation that
arbitrators, at the common law, possess no authority whatsoever, even
to administer an oath, or to compel the attendance of witnesses. They
cannot compel the production of documents, and papers and books of
account, or insist upon a discovery of facts from the parties under
oath. They are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the princi-
ples of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated
cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators
is but rusticum judicium. Ought then a court of equity to compel a
resort to such a tribunal, by which, however honest and intelligent, it
can in no case be clear that the real legal or equitable rights of the
parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?56
Here, too, modem courts recognize the potential "rough justice"
50. Id. at 438.
51. Id. at 438-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. For a discussion of possible differences in treating arbitrability of claims based on the
Securities Act of 1933 and those based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see infra note
68 and accompanying text.
53. See Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1968);
Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (dictum).
54. In both the commercial and labor areas, courts tend to defer to arbitration awards.
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, statu-
tory and nonstatutory standards for judicial review of arbitration awards provide a vehicle for
public officials to protect the public interest against private awards that slight it.
55. E.g., Fiss, supra note 2, at 1082-83 (Pre-judicial resolution does not provide an ade-
quate basis for subsequent judicial involvement in the controversy, and "findings of fact" and
"conclusions of law" in a nonjudicial resolution may represent "the product of a bargain
between the parties rather than of a trial and an independent judicial judgment.").
56. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065).
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quality of the arbitral process. In McDonald v. City of West Branch,5 7
which involved an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Supreme
Court refused to give collateral estoppel or res judicata effect to a prior
arbitration award, declaring:
[A]rbitral factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding.
As we explained in Gardner-Denver, "[tjhe record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not ap-
ply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discov-
ery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable."158
In sum, the reasons underlying Professor Fiss' denunciation of set-
tlement and ADR echo not only those voiced in arbitration cases of an
earlier era, but also those expressed in the opinions of modem judges in
contemporary arbitration cases. As exemplified in McDonald and the
cases cited therein, courts have recognized, and continue to recognize,
that the specific alternative dispute resolution device called "arbitration"
may be inferior to traditional judicial dispute resolution in the quality of
justice it accords to individual disputants as well as in its ability to pro-
tect public interests.
B. Legislative Encouragement of Arbitration
Despite its perceived shortcomings, arbitration is capable of serving
many important interests, both public and private. For the parties, it is
usually a much speedier process than judicial dispute resolution. Not
only can private interests be more readily vindicated, but the quicker
resolution of disputes reduces the threats to the public peace and safety
that long-festering private quarrels can generate. Arbitration is also usu-
ally much less expensive than judicial dispute resolution, thereby freeing
the parties' financial resources for other, more socially productive pur-
poses. By diverting cases from the regular judicial system, arbitration
also facilitates the efficient performance of the judicial function in other
cases. In addition, by allowing the parties to choose who will decide
their dispute, rather than having that choice imposed upon them by gov-
ernmental authority, arbitration offers two other benefits: the likelihood
that the dispute resolvers will know more about the disputed subject than
ordinary judges or juries; and the probability that the parties will be more
comfortable with the ultimate outcome, regardless of who wins or loses.
In recognition of some or all of these factors, the arbitration situa-
57. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
58. Id. at 291 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974)); see
infra text accompanying notes 103-27.
tion has changed dramatically. Starting with the New York Arbitration
Act of 1920, and followed by the United States Arbitration Act of 1925
(also known as the Federal Arbitration Act) and extensive state enact-
ments of the Uniform Arbitration Act, Congress and most state legisla-
tures have essentially repudiated the traditional judicial hostility toward
arbitration. Under these statutes, agreements to arbitrate, with some ex-
ceptions, are now valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. Thus, the arbitra-
tion statutes honor parties' agreements to entrust the resolution of their
disputes to nonpublic neutral parties. Nevertheless, in response to the
apprehensions expressed by Professor Fiss, it can be said that, in each of
these statutes, the fundamental decision to honor the private agreements
has been made by publicly elected and politically accountable legislators.
It is significant, moreover, that despite the persistence of shortcom-
ings in the arbitration process, 59 courts frequently refer to the "public
59. Modem statutes have not entirely eliminated arbitration's procedural shortcomings.
Discovery rights in arbitration, for example, are generally limited to the "taking of depositions
of witnesses who cannot be subpoenaed or who are unable to attend the hearing." United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 117, 597 P.2d 290, 302 (1979). In arbitra-
tions of disputes under collective-bargaining agreements between parties covered by the
NLRA, the good-faith bargaining duty imposed upon employers and unions provides a
broader, but still extremely limited, range of discovery. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co.,
385 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1967).
Evidence rules in arbitration remain highly informal. Section 10(c) of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982), provides that an award may be vacated "[w]here the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct... in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy." No similar sanction is provided for cases in which arbitrators have received
prejudicial evidence that was neither pertinent nor material to the controversy.
Although they are often required to interpret legal doctrines that affect contracts, see, eg.,
Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 35 Cal.3d 312, 317
n.2, 673 P.2d 251, 253 n.2, 197 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 n.2 (1983), or that have been incorporated
into contracts, arbitrators need not be trained in the law. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), Justice Black observed that
the legal issue of a contract's voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons
designated to arbitrate factual controversies arising out of a valid contract between
the parties. And the arbitrators who the Court holds are to adjudicate the legal
validity of the contract need not even be lawyers, and in all probability will be
nonlawyers, wholly' unqualified to decide legal issues, and even if qualified to apply
the law, not bound to do so.
Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Supreme Court
noted other infirmities in the arbitration process:
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed both by the Seventh
Amendment and by Ch. 1, Art. 12th, of the Vermont Constitution. Arbitrators do
not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their rea-
sons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a
court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a
trial ....
Id. at 203 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-438 (1953)).
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interest" in nonjudicial dispute resolution when applying modem arbitra-
tion statutes. In the labor field, for example, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized arbitration as playing a" 'central role... in effectuating national
labor policy' and preventing industrial strife." 6° In a case arising under
the Railway Labor Act,61 the Court stated:
The fact that Congress has indicated its purpose to make negotiation
obligatory is in itself a declaration of public interest and policy which
should be persuasive in inducing courts to give relief. It is for similar
reasons that courts, which traditionally have refused to compel per-
formance of a contract to submit to arbitration, .... enforce statutes
commanding performance of arbitration agreements.62
Similar statements appear in many commercial arbitration cases.
To cite only one example, in Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics,
Inc.,63 the Seventh Circuit stated: "[T]he public interest is served by
granting this injunctive relief because there is a strong policy in favor of
carrying out commercial arbitration when a contract contains an arbitra-
tion clause. Arbitration lightens courts' workloads, and it usually results
in a speedier resolution of controversies." 64
V. Resolving Conflicts Between Opposing Public Interests
Despite the strong proarbitration policies of the Federal Arbitration
Act 65 and similar state statutes, courts have often grappled with the ques-
tion of whether other statutory or judicially recognized public policies
absolve parties who willingly agree to arbitrate future disputes (or even
existing disputes) of their commitment. For example, in Wilko v.
Swan, 66 the Supreme Court held that, despite the arbitration agreement,
suit could be brought to redress an alleged violation of section 12(2) of
60. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 254 (1974)
(quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964)).
61. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-181 (1982).
62. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (citation
omitted).
63. 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 976 (1984).
64. Id. at 352. Although the goals of reducing courts' workloads and promoting speedier
conflict resolution ignore Professor Fiss' concerns about the purpose of adjudication, they nev-
ertheless reflect other public interests that should be weighed in particular cases.
65. A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter aris-
ing out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing contro-
versy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
66. 346 U.S. 427, 435-38 (1953). See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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the Securities Act of 1933. In effect, the Court weighed the strong pro-
arbitration policy of the FAA against the strong policy favoring judicial
resolution of disputes expressed in section 12(2) of the Securities Act. At
least with respect to agreements to arbitrate future controversies, the
Court concluded that the Securities Act's prohibition against waiving its
provisions indicated Congress' intention that the prohibition should out-
weigh the policy of the FAA under the circumstances of that case.
In Wilko the Court's choice was relatively straightforward. Two
conflicting public policies or interests, each defined by Congress, had to
be reconciled. One strongly favored arbitration of commercial disputes;
the other strongly favored protection of special benefits conferred upon
securities buyers, including the right to judicial dispute resolution.
In some cases, however, public interests that appear to conflict can
be reconciled by finding that they do not conflict at all. Thus, even in
Wilko, the Court stressed that the arbitration agreement covered future
controversies, intimating that arbitration of an existing Securities Act
dispute would not constitute the kind of waiver of Securities Act provi-
sions envisioned by section 14 of the Act. Justice Jackson expressly en-
dorsed this view in his concurring opinion, and lower courts have since
taken a similar position.67 In effect, the Court in Wilko read the public
policy expressed in section 14 of the Securities Act as protecting only the
right not to bind onself to arbitrate a dispute before it has arisen. If,
when confronting an actual controversy, a securities buyer willingly
agrees to submit that dispute to arbitration, the policy of the Securities
Act would not, according to the Court, be violated.
A. Conflicting Policies in Securities Cases After Wilko
Although there is considerable overlap between the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, they are marked by
certain procedural differences, among others.68 Because of these differ-
67. See, e.g., Malena v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,492 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1984):
The principle that emerges from the cases evaluating the validity of arbitration
clauses is that, while a waiver in futuro will not be permitted under Wilko, an agree-
ment to arbitrate an existing dispute made when a party has full knowledge of the
facts therein will be excepted from the Wilko doctrine.
Id. 98,449.
68. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982), has been described in gen-
eral terms as requiring "the registration of securities publicly offered by a company or persons
controlling a company, and the use of a prospectus in connection with such public offering.
The Securities Act also regulates fraud in connection with the sale of securities." H. BLOO-
MENTHAL, SECURrIIs LAW HANDBOOK 15 (1984). By contrast, in addition to a number of
other important requirements, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb
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ences, the Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.69 and Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd 70 expressed reservations about the applica-
bility of Wilko's reasoning to the 1934 Act. As noted in Justice White's
concurring opinion in Byrd:
While § 29 of [the 1934] Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a), is equivalent to § 14
of the 1933 Act, counterparts of the other two provisions are imperfect
or absent altogether. Jurisdiction under the 1934 Act is narrower, be-
ing restricted to the federal courts. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. More important,
the cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, involved here, is
implied rather than express.... The phrase "waive compliance with
any provisions of this chapter," 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (emphasis added),
is thus literally inapplicable. Moreover, Wilko's solicitude for the fed-
eral cause of action-the "special right" established by Congress, 346
U.S. at 431-is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action is
judicially implied and not so different from the common law action.71
In Byrd the Court assumed, but did not decide, that Wilko's reason-
ing applied to the 1934 Act-that one could not be bound to an agree-
(1982), "regulates fraud and manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
and generally regulates trading markets in securities." H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra, at 15.
69. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see infra note 78.
70. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
71. Id. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). With regard to Justice White's argument con-
cerning the literal inapplicability of the phrase "any provisions of this chapter," see Boys
Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957). Lincoln Mills held that § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which ap-
peared to be only a jurisdictional statute, authorized the federal courts to fashion a body of
federal common law governing the enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements in com-
merce. 353 U.S. at 451. Lucas Flour held that state courts had to participate in fashioning that
federal common law, and that one of its principles was that, despite the absence of a no-strike
promise in a collective-bargaining agreement, a union is impliedly bound not to strike over any
matter that the contract makes subject to arbitration. 369 U.S. at 105. Finally, in Boys Mar-
kets, the Court, looking back at what it had done in Lucas Flour, stated that it had sustained
"an award of damages by a state court to an employer for a breach by the union of a no-strike
provision in its contract." 398 U.S. at 243. Thus, if the Court can characterize an implied no-
strike provision as a "provision in the contract," it would not be too difficult for it to conclude
that the implied cause of action under § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is "a provi-
sion of the law." This conclusion finds further support in evidence that Congress intended to
create a private cause of action for violation of § 10. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1934). Recently, the United States Courts of Appeals have disagreed on whether
customer claims arising from a broker's alleged violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act are arbitrable. Compare Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 2076 (9th
Cir. 1986) and Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 2114 (3d
Cir. 1986) (both holding such claims nonarbitrable) with Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 2075 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding them arbitrable). The
Supreme Court has recently granted review in Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 788 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1986), in which one of the questions presented is: "Are federal district courts
barred from enforcing agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of contractual relationships if
those claims assert [an] implied right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act?" 55 U.S.L.W. 3197 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-44).
ment to arbitrate a future controversy that was cognizable under the
1934 Act.72 The Court did decide, however, that otherwise arbitrable
state law claims governed by the FAA should neither be stayed nor re-
quired to be tried in federal court together with the nonarbitrable federal
Securities Act claim-even if the two were "intertwined." 73
In reaching its result, the Court engaged in a process that it has
frequently employed in resolving apparent conflicts between the public
policies expressed in different statutes, namely that of determining a stat-
ute's primary purpose. In Byrd, the statute subjected to this process was
the FAA itself. The court of appeals had reasoned that the FAA's "goal
of speedy and efficient decision-making is thwarted by bifurcated pro-
ceedings, and that, given the absence of clear direction on this point, the
intent of Congress in passing the Act controls and compels a refusal to
compel arbitration [of the state law claims]." Although the Supreme
Court noted in response that Congress was not "blind to the potential
benefit of the legislation for expedited resolution of disputes," it con-
cluded that "passage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had en-
tered, and we must not overlook this principal objective when construing
the statute, or allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute
resolution to overshadow the underlying motivation." 74 In other words,
according to the Court, speedy and efficient decision-making is merely an
incidental by-product of the FAA, whereas enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate is its primary goal. The Court's conclusion on this point is an
example of how characterizing a statute's primary purpose can be a vehi-
cle for reconciling apparently conflicting public interests by determining
that they do not conflict at all.75
72. "In the District Court, Dean Witter did not seek to compel arbitration of the federal
securities claims. Thus, the question whether Wilko applies to § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims is
not properly before us." Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.1.
73. Id. at 1241.
74. Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). The court of appeals also relied on the argument that
the award disposing of the state law claims could have a collateral estoppel effect on the Secur-
ities Act claim. The Supreme Court disposed of this argument by observing that
courts may directly and effectively protect federal interests by determining the
preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding. Since preclusion doctrine
comfortably plays this role, it follows that neither a stay of the arbitration proceed-
ings, nor a refusal to compel arbitration of state claims is required in order to assure
that a precedent arbitration does not impede a subsequent federal-court action.
Id. at 1243.
75. In Byrd, the Court relied heavily on the FAA's legislative history for its characteriza-
tion. See 105 S. Ct. at 1242 n.7; see also 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (The FAA "creates no
new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial
contracts and in admiralty contracts."). By contrast, the Supreme Court's recent examination
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
January 1987] ARBITRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Byrd also exemplifies another setting in which courts have recon-
ciled seemingly competing public interests in arbitration cases-namely
when more than two public policies affect the arbitrability of disputes. In
Byrd, the FAA required enforcement of arbitration agreements in com-
merce. The Court assumed, however, that the policies of the Securities
Act of 1933, which sustained Wilko's result, applied to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, therefore pulling in the opposite direction, against
enforcing agreements to arbitrate future disputes. By contrast, the state
law claims were clearly covered by the FAA, and no statutory policy
outside the FAA exerted an opposite pull. Although the FAA's policy of
encouraging expedited dispute resolution arguably disallowed bifurcation
of the proceedings when the clearly arbitrable disputes were "inter-
twined" with a nonarbitrable dispute, thereby pulling the entire case in
the direction of judicial resolution, the Court rejected these arguments,
and held, in effect, that the FAA's basic proarbitration policy required
the state law claims to be arbitrated, despite the resulting loss of
efficiency.
There are many more common examples of cases in which more
than two public policies affect the arbitrability of a dispute. Typically,
one policy pulls toward allowing arbitration, while a second pulls in the
opposite direction. Finally, a third public policy, such as the importance
of international comity, can lead a court to retreat toward the original
proarbitration direction. Antitrust arbitration cases provide a clear ex-
ample of the tensions created by such competing policies.
B. Public Policies in Antitrust Arbitration
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 76 is a re-
cent example of the Court finding that an apparently conflicting statutory
or common-law public policy does not actually conflict with the proarbi-
tration policy of the FAA. The plaintiff, Mitsubishi, had sought a federal
court order requiring the defendant, Soler, to arbitrate a dispute in ac-
cordance with a provision of their sales agreement. Soler counterclaimed
that Mitsubishi and another party had committed antitrust violations,
and sought a mandatory treble damage award under the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause of the Mitsubishi-
Soler sales agreement was binding on the parties because it was contained
"in an agreement embodying an international transaction. ' 77
of the "primary" purpose of the antitrust law's treble damage remedy did not address the
legislative history of that statute. See infra Section V.B.
76. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
77. Id. at 3349.
The Mitsubishi Court's reasoning purported to be essentially based
on that of the earlier Scherk case,78 which reasoned that: (1) arbitration
clauses are a species of forum selection clause which, in an international
setting, had been approved by the Court in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co. ;79 (2) the international character of the transaction created the possi-
bility that a foreign litigant who lost in an American court action could
obtain a foreign court order enjoining the enforcement of the American
judgment; (3) not allowing the matter to be arbitrated abroad risked con-
veying to the international business and legal communities an impression
that the American legal system was preoccupied with "parochial" con-
cerns; and (4) the Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, which Congress had ratified in 1970, indicated Congress' inten-
tion that special deference be paid to foreign arbitral agreements.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the rationale of Ameri-
can Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co.,80 a 1968 decision of
the Second Circuit which had been widely followed by other courts. In
that case, which involved an entirely domestic transaction, the Second
Circuit held that public policy considerations rendered antitrust claims
nonarbitrable. In rejecting this holding in an international context, the
Mitsubishi Court first noted "the absence of any explicit support for such
an [antitrust] exception in either the Sherman Act or the Federal Arbi-
tration Act."8' Thus, unlike the conflict between two federal statutory
policies in Wilko, the American Safety rationale for removing antitrust
claims from arbitration did not rest on statutory grounds, but stemmed
instead from other public policy considerations. The considerations that
had been identified by the lower courts were described by the Supreme
Court as follows:
First, private parties play a pivotal role in aiding governmental en-
78. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), was the forerunner of both Mit-
subishi and Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd. Scherk, like Byrd, involved the appli-
cability of the Wilko doctrine to a claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. InScherk
the Court noted first that "a colorable argument could be made that even the semantic reason-
ing of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us," 417 U.S. at 513, for the reasons
repeated ten years later in Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd. As in Byrd, however,
the Scherk Court did not decide the applicability of Wilko. Rather, it merely assumed that
"the operative portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in Wilko are contained in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Id. at 515. A decision on whether the policy and
language of the 1934 Act itself required courts to honor predispute arbitration agreements was
rendered unnecessary by the fact that "the contract to purchase the business entities belonging
to Scherk was a truly international agreement." Id. That fact, according to the Court, made
Wilko "inapposite" to Scherk. Id. at 517.
79. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
80. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
81. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
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forcement of the antitrust laws by means of the private action for
treble damages. Second, "the strong possibility that contracts which
generate antitrust disputes may be contracts of adhesion militates
against automatic forum determination by contract." Third, antitrust
issues, prone to complication, require sophisticated legal and economic
analysis, and thus are "il-adapted to strengths of the arbitral process,
i.e., expedition, minimal requirements of written rationale, simplicity,
resort to basic concepts of common sense and simple equity." Finally,
just as "issues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the
generals ... decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too
important to be lodged in arbitrators chosen from the business commu-
nity-particularly those from a foreign community that has had no
experience with or exposure to our law and values." '82
Without ruling on the arbitrability of antitrust disputes in domestic
situations, the Mitsubishi majority rejected these underlying justifications
for the American Safety doctrine. In its view, the "mere appearance of
an antitrust dispute" did not warrant a presumption that an arbitration
provision was the result of an adhesion contract.8 3 The Court also dis-
missed the potential complexity of antitrust disputes as a reason for hold-
ing them nonarbitrable, noting that even courts that had followed the
American Safety rule had "agreed that an undertaking to arbitrate anti-
trust claims entered into after the dispute arises is acceptable."'84 The
Court also declined "to indulge the presumption that the parties and ar-
bitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain
competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators. '8 5
Most important was the Court's rejection of what it described as
"the core of the American Safety doctrine-the fundamental importance
to American democratic capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws."'8 6
The court of appeals in Mitsubishi had observed that "[a] claim under the
antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus,
the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a pri-
vate attorney-general who protects the public's interest. 87 The response
of the Supreme Court majority to this argument is particularly
instructive:
The importance of the private damages remedy... does not compel
the conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court.
82. Id. at 3357 (citing American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-27).
83. Id. at 3346.
84. Id. (citing Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich
& Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972)).
85. Id. at 3358.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826).
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Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function, the treble-
damages cause of action conferred on private parties by § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and pursued by Soler here by way of its
third counterclaim, seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to
gain compensation for that injury.88
Although the majority acknowledged that the antitrust treble dam-
age remedy serves important public interests transcending those of the
private plaintiff, it determined that the primary purpose of that cause of
action is compensatory. In effect, the majority resorted to the familiar
device of characterization to conclude that, despite the apparent conflict
between private and public interests, Congress really intended private in-
terests to prevail when it created the private treble damage action for
antitrust violations.
The Court's conclusion is difficult to accept, however, when one
contemplates the nature of treble damage remedies. To characterize as
primarily compensatory a remedy that allows injured plaintiffs to recover
greater damages than they have actually suffered defies both logic and
history. Treble damage awards, like exemplary damages, are designed to
punish and deter wrongdoers from engaging in similar conduct in the
future. The ultimate beneficiaries of such punishment and deterrence are
third parties-other potential victims of such conduct. Indeed, the Mit-
subishi majority's exercise in characterization would have been much
more convincing had it concluded that, despite its "incidental" compen-
satory function, the "primary" purpose of the private treble-damage rem-
edy in antitrust suits was to police the conduct of antitrust violators.
Several problems, underscored in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, emerge from the Mit-
subishi decision. In Justice Stevens' view, a close reading of the FAA
indicates that Congress did not intend it to apply to any federal statutory
claim, and especially not to one based on such strong public policy fac-
tors as the need to maintain free competition in the American market-
place.8 9 For many of the same reasons advanced by Professor Fiss,
Justice Stevens asserted that courts rather than privately selected arbitra-
tors are the proper tribunals to decide such claims. Moreover, noted the
dissent, the main factor that had justified the Scherk result was absent in
Mitsubishi. In Scherk, the parties to the international agreement had
faced a potential choice-of-law problem. By contrast, the Court's deter-
88. Id. at 3358-59 (emphasis added). Although the Court did not expressly reject Ameri-
can Safety's holding that, in a domestic situation, parties are not bound by their agreement to
arbitrate future antitrust disputes, this discussion of private actions as "incidental" suggests
that it will do so in an appropriate case.
89. Id. at 3364 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mination in Mitsubishi that the Japanese arbitrators were required to ap-
ply the Sherman Act, the same law that would be applied by an
American court, removed that element from the case. In addition, the
fear of being perceived as "parochial" by insisting upon American court
adjudication of American antitrust claims was unwarranted since most
industrialized countries, including Japan, have strong antitrust policies.
Finally, in Justice Stevens' opinion, the Convention on the Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards explicitly recognizes that a signatory state
does not have to enforce an arbitration agreement if it violates a strong
public policy of another signatory state whose law is to be applied.90
The central question in Mitsubishi was whether the public interest
would be properly served by enforcing an international arbitration agree-
ment that conferred upon foreign arbitrators the right to decide whether
a party's conduct had violated American antitrust laws. In addressing
this question, the Court first had to identify the relevant public interests.
Clearly, the FAA, including the Convention on the Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, militated in favor of allowing the case to be arbi-
trated. However, the doctrine of nonarbitrability of antitrust disputes
that had been developed by the lower courts in domestic situations ar-
gued against allowing the dispute to be arbitrated. In the end, however,
the Court determined that "international comity," with all its constituent
elements, required it to uphold the arbitrability of this dispute.
One way of describing the process the Court engaged in has already
been suggested: the Court determined that apparently conflicting public
interests did not conflict at all. Another is to say that the Court, after
determining that apparently conflicting public policies conflicted in fact,
reconciled the conflict by holding that one public policy (or interest) out-
weighed the others.
C. Judicial Review of Arbitration and the Public Interest
After assessing the competing policies implicated in the arbitration
of antitrust claims, the Mitsubishi Court employed still another tech-
nique that deals, albeit imperfectly, with some of the issues raised by
Professor Fiss' criticism of settlement and ADR. Specifically, Professor
Fiss has argued that nonjudicial dispute resolution "mistakenly assumes
judgment to be the end of the process" and therefore fails to provide an
adequate foundation for subsequent judicial involvement if the parties
continue or renew their dispute.91 The Mitsubishi opinion suggests that
90. Id. at 3371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1082.
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the Supreme Court was aware of this shortcoming in arbitration cases.
Although the Court held that the case could be arbitrated by Japanese
arbitrators, it indicated that "the national courts of the United States will
have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that the
legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been
addressed." 92
Among other things, this could mean that if the Japanese arbitrators
find that Mitsubishi Motors had violated the Sherman Act, they would
have to award treble damages to Soler as a result of such violation. Such
a holding would appear to contravene prevailing principles governing the
authority of arbitrators to render punitive awards. Despite some recent
cases to the contrary,93 courts have generally held that public policy con-
siderations prohibit arbitrators from awrding punitive or exemplary
damages.94 The basic rationale for such rulings is that the power to pun-
ish wrongdoers is a nondelegable monopoly possessed by the sovereign.
Despite the Court's characterization of the treble damage remedy as pri-
marily compensatory, it would be somewhat anomalous for the Court to
require the Japanese arbitrators to award treble damages if they find an
antitrust violation-unless this feature of the Mitsubishi ruling augurs
the development of new federal doctrine governing the remedial author-
ity of arbitrators under the FAA,95 which arguably would be binding on
state courts in cases to which the FAA otherwise applies.96
92. Mitsubishi 105 S. Ct. at 3360. The Court also offered the following pertinent
observations:
At oral argument,... counsel for Mitsubishi conceded that American law applied to
the antitrust claims and represented that the claims had been submitted to the arbi-
tration panel in Japan on that basis.... We therefore have no occasion to speculate
on [whether an arbitration panel would read a choice-of-law clause in this contract as
not merely governing interpretation of the contract terms, but wholly displacing
American law].... Nor need we consider now the effect of an arbitral tribunal's
failure to take cognizance of the statutory cause of action on the claimant's capacity
to reinitiate suit in federal court. We merely note that in the event the choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a
party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have
little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.
Id. at 3359 n.19.
93. See, eg., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353,
365 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 684
(1984).
94. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 795, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1976).
95. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (fed-
eral court may not consider claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract, but may only
consider issues relating to arbitration agreement).
96. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984); see also Hirshman, The
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A more plausible explanation is that the Court did not intend to
develop a general federal rule permitting arbitrators to award punitive
damages. Rather, it departed from the general rule in order to accomo-
date the competing public interests in the Mitsubishi case. Despite the
majority's gallant words about requiring arbitration in the interest of in-
ternational comity, the arguments against permitting arbitration of anti-
trust disputes in a domestic context are in certain respects more
persuasive when applied to international situations. Although potential
Japanese arbitrators might be expert in the intricacies of American anti-
trust law,97 American arbitrators selected by the parties to such disputes
are likely to have superior knowledge and understanding of this field. By
permitting the judiciary to review whether the foreign arbitration panel
has properly applied the Sherman Act to the case, therefore, the Mitsub-
ishi Court appeared to provide an extraordinary measure of judicial re-
view to accomodate the public interests which call for judicial, rather
than arbitral, determination of the underlying dispute.98
Similar techniques of reconciling competing public interests have
been employed by other courts. In Faherty v. Faherty, 99 for example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court examined the public interest considerations
affecting agreements to arbitrate postmarital disputes over spousal sup-
port, child support, and child custody. Calculations of the character and
intensity of relevant public interests produced different results with re-
spect to each of these types of disputes.
Determining that the spouses themselves could freely settle the issue
of a postmarital support obligation, the court found no public policy ob-
Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization ofArbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305 (1985)
(FAA is governing law in state courts, with federal policy favoring arbitration).
97. "iTihe arbitration panel selected to hear the parties' claims here is composed of three
Japanese lawyers, one a former law school dean, another a former judge, and the third a prac-
ticing attorney with American legal training who has written on Japanese antitrust law." Mit-
subishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3358 n.18.
98. In Wilko, the Court stated that "[i]n unrestricted submissions, such as the present
margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to
manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpre-
tation." 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (emphasis added). In Reynolds Sec. v. Macquown, 459
F. Supp. 943, 945 (W.D. Pa. 1978), the court stated: "In order to have an award vacated on
grounds of manifest disregard of law, the complaining party must establish that the arbitrator
understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it." Accord Local 771,
I.A.T.S.E. v. R.K.O. Gen., 546 F.2d 1107, 1113 (2d Cir. 1977).
By contrast, it would appear that in Mitsubish4 even if the Japanese arbitrators mistak-
enly decided that the Sherman Act was not applicable, their award could be set aside since the
Supreme Court has decided, as a matter of federal law, that the Sherman Act must be applied
in such a case. In effect, the Court has promulgated a federal choice-of-law for arbitrators in
such situations.
99. 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984).
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jections to allowing them to refer such questions to arbitration. Not all
jurisdictions, however, favor arbitration to such an extent. In many
states, for example, courts will not approve support provisions in marital
dissolution settlement agreements unless they are fair and adequate in
the light of the needs and financial abilities of the wife and husband.'0 °
The public interest in equitable postmarital support arrangements is
clear. Suppose, for example, that a couple had been married for thirty
years, that one spouse earned $100,000 per year, and that the other was
physically incapacitated. Suppose further that the couple concluded that
their marriage was no longer viable, and decided to dissolve it. Even if
the disabled spouse were willing to waive financial support, the public
would have a strong interest in not having a court permit such a waiver,
since the disabled spouse might therefore become a public charge.
Would the public policy factors be any different if the decision to forego
spousal support had been made not by the spouses themselves, but by an
arbitrator to whom they had delegated the power to decide? It seems
not. Nevertheless, Faherty appears to permit unfettered recourse to arbi-
tration of postmarital support obligations, even though the results could
be contrary to the public interest.
Notwithstanding its strong endorsement of arbitration in the area of
postmarital child support, the Faherty court recognized a special public
interest arising from the state's parens patriae role in the welfare of the
child. As a result, although it concluded that child support issues are
arbitrable, the court created a special standard of judicial review, over
and above the state's statutory standards, 01 to ensure that an arbitrator
has not slighted the "substantial best interest" of the child (and thus the
public's interest). In the process, normal judicial deference to arbitral
awards is abjured. According to Faherty, after the normal statutory re-
view of the award, "the courts should conduct a de novo review unless it
is clear on the face of the award that the award could not adversely affect
100. See, eg., Baumler v. Baumler, 368 So. 2d 864, 865 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Mayeur v.
Mayeur, 42 Ill. App. 3d 7, 8, 355 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1976).
101. New Jersey's statutory standards for judicial review of arbitration awards, which re-
semble those under the FAA and other state arbitration statutes, provide:
ETihe court shall vacate the award in any of the following cases: a. Where the award
was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; b. Where there was either evi-
dent partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitra-
tors were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to
the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; d.
Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mu-
tual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 24-8 (West 1952).
[Vol. 38
January 1987] ARBITRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
the substantial best interests of the child."102
D. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Admission of Arbitration
Decisions into Evidence
Another technique for protecting public interests after arbitration
awards have been rendered is to limit the awards' issue- and claim-
preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings. Here, too, courts and admin-
istrative agencies have devised fragile compromises which arguably pro-
vide less than adequate safeguards for important public policies.
In a series of cases starting with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 10 3 the Supreme Court has been faced with a recurring situation: An
employee has been discharged or otherwise allegedly mistreated by an
employer for reasons that arguably violate a federal law that provides
specific remedies for such violations. At the same time, the employee is
represented by a labor union that has concluded a collective-bargaining
agreement with the employer which provides that the employer will not
engage in the type of conduct that is prohibited by the federal law-
although the agreement does not refer to federal law as such. The agree-
ment also contains a grievance-arbitration mechanism for resolving dis-
putes that arise under it. The employee grieves the employer's conduct,
and the case is arbitrated. The arbitrator concludes that the employee
was discharged for just cause or that the alleged mistreatment did not
occur. The employee then seeks relief under the applicable federal law-
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Gardner-Denver; the Fair Labor
Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 104 42
U.S.C. section 1983 in McDonald v. City of West Branch.10 5
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that,
because of the prior arbitral award and the principles of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, waiver, or election of remedies, the employee should
be precluded from pursuing the federal statutory remedy. The Court
also refused to adopt a rule that would require federal courts to defer to
102. Faherty, 97 N.J. at 110, 477 A.2d at 1263. The Faherty court did not decide the
arbitrability of child custody and visitation rights, but did recognize that the issue also
presented a conflict between the state's policy of encouraging arbitration and the danger of
infringement of the court's parenspatriae role. Nevertheless, the court stated that "the devel-
opment of a fair and workable mediation or arbitration process to resolve [custody and visita-
tion] issues may be more beneficial to the children of this state than the present system of
courtroom confrontation." Id. This statement suggests that the court may permit arbitration
of such issues subject to possible de novo review to ensure protection of the children's best
interest, as the court required for child support disputes.
103. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
104. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
105. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
an arbitrator's decision in such cases.10 6 Many of the Court's reasons for
the results in this series of cases resemble those suggested by Professor
Fiss' general criticism of settlement and ADR: (1) an arbitrator's exper-
tise "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land"; 10 7 (2) an arbitrator has "no general authority to invoke public
laws that conflict with the bargain of the parties";108 (3) in the usual case,
"the union has exclusive control over the 'manner and extent to which an
individual grievance is presented' ,,;109 thus, "were an arbitration award
accorded preclusive effect, an employee's opportunity to be compensated
for a constitutional deprivation might be lost merely because it was not in
the union's interest to press his claim vigorously";' 10 and (4) "[a]rbitral
factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding.... [T]he
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules
of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil
trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and tes-
timony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable." '
Had the Court merely decided that the prior arbitral awards in these
cases did not preclude subsequent suit on the federal causes of action, the
results would have been substantially congruent with Professor Fiss'
views about the respective roles of judicial and nonjudicial dispute reso-
lution. The Court, however, did not stop there. In each case, it also held
106. In McDonald, the Court also rejected the contention that the federal full faith and
credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), requires a federal court to give the same preclusive
effect to a state court arbitration award as would the courts of the state rendering the judg-
ment. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 477 (1982), had previously held that
"[a]rbitration awards are not.., subject to the mandate of § 1738." The McDonald Court
noted that the Kremer conclusion followed from the plain language of § 1738, which by its
terms governs onlyjudicial proceedings: "Arbitration is not a 'judicial proceeding' and, there-
fore, § 1738 does not apply to arbitration awards." McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288. In Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, discussed supra text accompanying notes 70-75, the Court sug-
gested that "McDonald also establishes that courts may directly and effectively protect federal
interests by determining the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding." 105 S.
Ct. 1238, 1243 (1985) (emphasis added). In light of Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984), which held that the FAA preempted a state law voiding an arbitration clause in a
contract that was subject to the federal statute, it would appear that if the Supreme Court were
to determine that a particular state arbitration award has no collateral estoppel effect in a
federal court suit based on a federal statute, a similar result would obtain if the suit had been
brought in state court, regardless of any collateral estoppel effect accorded the award under
state law.
107. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57.
108. Id. at 53.
109. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291 (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.)
110. Id.
Ill. Id. (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58).
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that the arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence in the federal
court suit seeking to vindicate federal statutory rights.
In discussing the weight to be accorded the arbitral award in the
judicial proceeding, however, the Court revealed the central dilemma
pervading this entire area. In McDonald, restating principles that had
already been enunciated in Gardner-Denver and in Barrentine, the Court
declared:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral
decision, since this must be determined in the court's discretion with
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors
include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment that conform substantially with [the statute or Constitution], the
degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the
record with respect to the issue [in the judicial proceeding], and the
special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral deter-
mination gives full consideration to an employee's [statutory or consti-
tutional] rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is
especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically ad-
dressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an
adequate record. But courts should be ever mindful that Congress...
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolu-
tion of [these] claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availa-
bility of this forum.1 12
Under traditional evidence doctrine, absent a question of res judi-
cata, waiver, estoppel, or election of remedies, one tribunal's earlier deci-
sion is generally excluded as hearsay or opinion in a subsequent judicial
proceeding in a second tribunal.1 13 By permitting evidence of the arbi-
tral decision to be admitted in the federal statutory proceeding, therefore,
the Court plainly departed from established principles.
One can only guess why the Court abandoned these principles under
the circumstances of Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald. It is
not unreasonable, however, to suggest that, in a fundamental sense, the
Court was engaging in a process similar to the one it later employed in
Mitsubishi and which the New Jersey Supreme Court followed in
Faherty-namely the crafting of a compromise between the values of ju-
dicial and nonjudicial dispute resolution.
Intimations of this flexibility in reconciling conflicts between arbi-
112. Id. at 292 (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21).
113. "[IThe doctrine is accepted that a judgment in another cause, finding a fact now in
issue, is ordinarily not receivable." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1671a (Chadbourne rev. ed.
1974) (emphasis in original); see also Weak v. Weak, 202 Cal. App. 2d 632, 636, 21 Cal. Rptr.
9, 11 (1962) (interlocutory order inadmissible); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d
483, 497-501, 424 N.E.2d 586, 595-97 (1981) (Brown, J., dissenting) (admission of arbitration
decision violates equal protection).
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tration and judicial dispute resolution can also be seen in another aspect
of the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 114
In Byrd, the Court rejected the argument that federal courts should de-
cline to compel arbitration of pendent state law claims that are otherwise
arbitrable although they are "intertwined" with a nonarbitrable federal
claim, finding that the FAA's purpose of making arbitration agreements
enforceable outweighed its incidental promotion of efficient dispute
resolution.
In Byrd, the Court also noted that it had been suggested, "and some
Courts of Appeals have held, that district courts should decide arbitrable
pendent claims when a nonarbitrable federal claim is before them, be-
cause otherwise the findings in the arbitration proceeding might have col-
lateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent federal proceeding."'1 15 The
Court's response to this suggestion was to observe that "it is far from
certain that arbitration proceedings will have any preclusive effect on the
litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims." 116 It characterized McDonald
as establishing that "arbitration proceedings will not necessarily have a
preclusive effect on subsequent federal court proceedings" and "that
courts may directly and effectively protect federal interests by determin-
ing the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding."'1 17
Noting that the effect of an award in Byrd could be determined only after
the award had been rendered, the Court added: "Suffice it to say that in
framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account
the federal interests warranting protection." 118
Because the Court did not define or describe the "federal interests"
that must be taken into account in deciding what, if any, preclusive effect
is to be accorded a prior arbitral award in a subsequent judicial proceed-
ing under the Securities Act of 1934, lower courts may face difficult
problems of interpretation. Some guidance might be gleaned from the
factors the Court considered relevant in determining the weight to be
accorded prior arbitral decisions in actions under Title VII, the Fair La-
bor Standards Act, or 42 U.S.C. section 1983,119 but the cases discussing
those factors had first decided that evidence of the arbitral decision could
be admitted in the federal statutory proceeding-presumably because the
federal interests involved in such cases permitted it. Is this necessarily
114. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
115. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1243.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1244.
119. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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true of all federal interests? Ultimately, the answer will depend upon the
breadth or narrowness of the Court's characterization of particular fed-
eral interests-an extremely manipulable undertaking at best. 120 More-
over, in McDonald the Court had stressed that the arbitration award in
that case had been "unappealed," 121 a circumstance noted again by the
Byrd Court.122 This emphasis implied that an "appealed" award could
trigger the federal full faith and credit statute, thereby requiring federal
courts to give the appellate judgment the same effect it would receive in
the courts of the state in which it was rendered. 123 While the Supremacy
Clause1 24 might prevent a state appellate judgment from having a claim-
preclusive effect in suits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
arbitrator's factual findings, upheld "on appeal" by a state court, could
have issue-preclusive effect in federal suits. Thus, in a case like Byrd, a
state court's acceptance of an arbitral board's factual finding that the
securities purchaser had not been defrauded by the seller could well dis-
pose of the nonarbitrable federal claim under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
An additional complication arises, however, because of some uncer-
tainty about the meaning of the word "unappealed" as used in McDonald
and Byrd. Normally, appeals are dealt with by appellate courts. Review
of an arbitration award by a court of first instance may also be referred to
as an appeal. Thus, if a person who has lost in arbitration seeks to vacate
120. Arguably, there is no stronger federal interest than in ensuring the vindication of
rights protected by the United States Constitution. Since, in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which is designed to vindicate such rights, the McDonald Court permitted the arbitral award
to be received in evidence, the same result would very likely obtain in a federal court suit under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any other federal statute, absent other relevant factors.
A strong argument can be made, however, that the deference due labor arbitration awards,
evidence of which is admissible in federal court suits on federal statutory claims, is not neces-
sarily due an award in a commercial arbitration. Professor David Feller, for example, has
described labor arbitration as "the adjudicatory phase of a system of government." Feller,
Arbitration: The Days of its Glory Are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 97, 105 (1977). Collec-
tive bargaining agreements are a species of private legislation promulgated by employers and
unions to govern the economic existence of groups of employees. Because disputes over al-
leged securities fraud or other commercial matters do not share these characteristics, courts
could construct a justification for excluding evidence of an arbitral decision from a Securities
Act suit.
121. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 285.
122. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1243.
123. See supra note 106.
124. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
the award as being in violation of statutory standards, it can be reason-
ably contended that the award has been "appealed." If the "appellant"
then loses in court, it can be further claimed that the court has placed its
imprimatur upon the arbitrator's factual findings. But what if the loser
does not seek to set the award aside, but the winner in arbitration invokes
a state's summary procedure for confirming the award? 125 If the loser
contests the petition for confirmation, and the court confirms the award,
can an equally strong argument be made that it has been appealed? Fi-
nally, if the loser does not contest the petition for confirmation, but de-
faults instead, has there been an appeal?
These interpretive problems will have to be resolved in future cases.
Significant for present purposes, however, is that in explicating McDon-
ald the Byrd court promoted one public interest as expressed in the
FAA's proarbitration policy, but sought to defend other public interests
by suggesting that an arbitral decision's collateral estoppel effect in a suit
on a federal nonarbitrable claim must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
A similar reconciliation of interests can be seen in both Mitsubishi
and Faherty, 126 in which the courts allowed the arbitration of matters in
which strong public interests were implicated. At the same time, they
sought to protect those interests by providing for extraordinary types of
judicial review. This was a technique for accomodating, or compromis-
ing, competing public interests: on the one hand, the desire for amicable
resolution of postmarital disputes in Faherty and the imperatives of inter-
national comity in Mitsubishi; and, on the other, the "best interests" of
children in Faherty and the at least incidental benefit to the public con-
ferred by private treble-damage actions for antitrust violations in
Mitsubishi.
Mitsubishi's and Faherty's basic thrust was to uphold arbitration
against claims that to do so would violate important public interests, but
to accomodate those public interests by providing for an exceptional de-
gree of judicial review. By contrast, the basic thrust of Gardner-Denver,
Barrentine, and McDonald was to uphold judicial dispute resolution, but
to take account of the values of labor arbitration by departing from estab-
lished doctrine to allow in evidence the arbitrator's decision for whatever
125. Compare Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 1983) (con-
firmation of an arbitral award will not be granted in the absence of a live controversy over the
award) with Hellman v. Program Printing, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 915, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (con-
firmation proceedings divided into, first, a proceeding to confirm and, second, one to enforce
the award (citing International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 1893 v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 263 F.
Supp. 343, 347 (C.D. Cal. 1966))).
126. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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weight a trial court might accord it under the Supreme Court's general
criteria. Although the first set of decisions upheld arbitration and the
second judicial dispute resolution, each recognized that the issue was not
black and white, that strong arguments had been made for contrary con-
clusions. In short, courts have understood that philosophical absolutism
in reconciling tensions between private and judicial dispute resolution is
to be avoided; that, from a public policy perspective, each has merits and
defects; that greater experience with alternative dispute resolution mech-
anisms is required before these tensions can be finally resolved, and that,
in the interim, courts must deal with those issues on a case-by-case basis,
recognizing that legislative intervention is always a possibility. 127
VI. The Public Interest and the NLRB's Deferral Policies
In Against Settlement, Professor Fiss has extolled the virtues of ad-
judication over private dispute resolution. 128 Although his references to
adjudication appear to focus on judicial dispute resolution, his arguments
also encompass adjudication by administrative agencies, for administra-
tive agencies, like courts, are public bodies charged with interpreting and
implementing the values embodied in the statutory provisions that fall
within their jurisdictions. 129
Among administrative agencies, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) is one in which the relationship between public and pri-
vate interests takes on a special character. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) confers primary jurisdiction upon the Board to decide
whether employers or unions have violated the Act by committing unfair
labor practices. This jurisdiction covers claims that an employer has uni-
laterally instituted changes in hours, wages, or working conditions, in
violation of its duty to bargain over such matters with the employees'
designated bargaining representative, the union;130 that an employer has
127. See, eg., S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), introduced by Senator McConnell of
Kentucky. The bill, if enacted, would further amend Federal Rure of Civil Procedure 16(c) by
permitting monetary sanctions to be imposed against attorneys who fail to inform their clients
of the availability of alternative dispute resolution techniques. The bill would also amend Rule
68 by permitting costs, including attorney's fees, to be assessed against a party who unreasona-
bly refused an opponent's offer to resolve a conflict through an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism. The latter aspect of the bill is clearly insensitive to Professor Fiss' concerns in
Against Settlement. The former raises serious questions about the propriety of prescribing the
content of certain communications between an attorney and a client. See Costly Lawsuits:
Senate Bill Touts Alternative, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 19.
128. Whether by settlement or, as he referred to it later, any other "contrivance of ADR."
Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
129. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1085.
130. Section 8(a)(5) makes it "an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to
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discharged employees because they engaged in statutorily protected
union activities;13' that a union has restrained or coerced employees in
the exercise of their right to refrain from asserting rights guaranteed in
the NLRA; 132 that a union caused or attempted to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee;133 or that it has refused to bargain
with an employer whose employees it represents.' 3 4
Professor Robert Gorman has noted that "Board regulations pro-
vide that [an unfair labor practice] charge may be filed by 'any person'
and it is usually fied by the aggrieved employee or his union when an
employer is the charged party or by the aggrieved employee or employer
when a union is the charged party."'135 Charges are investigated by the
appropriate regional offices of the Board. If the Board issues a com-
plaint, the Board's General Counsel prosecutes the case before an admin-
istrative law judge who makes findings and conclusions and files a
recommended order. In the vast majority of cases, the NLRB adopts the
recommended orders of the administrative law judges. Those orders are
not self-executing, however, and the Board must seek enforcement in an
appropriate United States Court of Appeals. Either party may seek fur-
ther review in the United States Supreme Court.
The NLRA prescribes the NLRB's elaborate role in, and the de-
tailed public process for, determining whether an employer or union has
committed an unfair labor practice. Often, however, conduct that argua-
bly violates the Act is also subject to challenge as a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement between an employer and a union. Most agree-
ments, for example, contain clauses prohibiting the employer from dis-
charging employees except for just cause. An employee or a union might
claim that the employer discharged the employee for activity which
would not constitute a basis for a dismissal for "just cause." At other
times, an employer might claim that its statutory duty to bargain, which
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). Section 9(a) grants exclusive bargaining rights to the
representatives "designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the major-
ity of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes." Id. § 159(a).
13 1. Except for its authorization of certain collective-bargaining agreements requiring em-
ployees, after a designated time period, to become members of the union that is signatory to
the agreement, § 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by dis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. § 158(a)(3).
132. See id. §§ 157, 158(b)(1)(A).
133. Id. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2).
134. Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." Id. § 158(b)(3).
135. R. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW 7 (1976).
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normally continues during the life of the agreement, was waived by the
union in contractual language that requires interpretation. In such cases,
although the Board would have the power to interpret the contractual
language in dispute, 136 the question arises whether the Board should do
so when the contract contains an arbitration clause. Indeed, because al-
most all collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration provisions,
the Board has, in a variety of contexts, grappled with this issue.
The NLRB's fluctuating position on this question has tended to re-
flect changes in political administrations. Boards dominated by members
appointed by conservative presidents have been more likely to defer to
arbitration than Boards controlled by appointees of liberal presidents.
The Board's major decisions in this area need to be viewed against that
background.
In the 1955 case of Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,137 the Board dis-
missed charges on behalf of discharged employees against an employer
on the ground that the true reason striking employees had been fired was,
according to an already rendered arbitration award, their misconduct
during a strike. In explaining its disposition of the case, the Board
stated:
[T]he [arbitration] proceedings appear to have been fair and regular,
all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration
panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.
In these circumstances we believe that the desirable objective of en-
couraging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes will be best served
by our recognition of the arbitrators' award. 138
In Raytheon Co., a 1963 decision, the Board modified the Spielberg
standards so as to condition deferral on the arbitrator's having "consid-
ered the unfair labor practice issue,"' 139 a standard which proved difficult
to apply. 140 Eight years later, in Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 141 a refusal-
to-bargain case, the Board expanded its deferral policy by declining to
hear a case in which arbitration had not yet been held. Although it dis-
missed the unfair labor practice complaint, the Board retained jurisdic-
tion of the case solely for the purpose of entertaining a motion for further
consideration upon a showing that either (a) the dispute was not properly
settled or submitted to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration
136. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967).
137. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
138. Id. at 1082.
139. 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 885-86 (1963).
140. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) ("[Clonsistent application of the Ray-
theon requirement has proven elusive ... .
141. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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procedures were unfair or reached a result contrary to the Act. 142 The
Board's rationale for its deferral policy was based on a variety of factors:
(1) the language of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
which states that "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing col-
lective-bargaining agreement"; 143 (2) the presumed expertise of arbitra-
tors in deciding such disputes; and (3) the importance of requiring parties
to abide by their contractual commitments to submit such disputes to
arbitration. 1"4
Not long after it decided Collyer, the Board held that it would defer
to prospective arbitration awards not only in refusal-to-bargain cases, but
also in any case alleging union or employer unfair labor practices di-
rected against individual employees. 145 Five years later, the Board re-
versed itself, limiting prospective deferral to refusal-to-bargain cases,
largely on the strength of the swing vote of Chairman Murphy, who ar-
gued that "the Board should stay its processes in favor of the parties'
grievance arbitration machinery only in those situations where the dis-
pute is essentially between the contracting parties and where there is no
alleged interference with individual employees' basic rights under Section
7 of the Act." 146
In two recent decisions, United Technologies Corp. 147 and Olin
Corp., 148 however, the Board once again broadened its deferral practices.
Under United Technologies, the Board now defers to arbitration in cases
alleging union or employer unlawful activity directed against individual
employees as well as in refusal-to-bargain cases. According to the Board
majority in that case:
Where an employer and a union have voluntarily elected to create dis-
pute resolution machinery culminating in final and binding arbitration,
it is contrary to the basic principles of the Act for the Board to jump
into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their
disputes through that machinery. 149
At the same time, Olin purported to clarify the factors that the
Board will take into account in determining whether an arbitrator has
adequately considered the unfair labor practice: the arbitrator will be
142. Id. at 843.
143. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
144. See Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 840.
145. National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 530 (1972).
146. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977).
147. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
148. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
149. United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 559.
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deemed to have done so if the contractual issue and the unfair labor prac-
tice issue are factually parallel, the arbitrator has been presented with the
facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice claim, and the arbitra-
tor's decision is not inconsistent with the Act. 150
Thus, in deferring to an existing or prospective award the Board, in
effect, examines that award to determine whether the arbitrator has vin-
dicated public policy in the labor field. Under the criteria enunciated in
Olin, however, that examination is extremely shallow, creating the strong
possibility that the Board will dismiss unfair labor practice charges on
the basis of an award that did not actually dispose of them. Indeed, by
adopting its various deferral policies, the Board has left itself open to the
charge, lodged by dissenting members1 51 and outside commentators,152
that it is abandoning to private arbitrators its statutory function of decid-
ing unfair labor practice charges. Indeed, the Board has frankly ac-
knowledged that its deferral policy is motivated in large part by a desire
to ease its own work load.153
The argument that the Board's deferral policy represents an aban-
donment of its statutory obligations has much force and is consistent
with Professor Fiss' overall critique of settlement and alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. In many ways, the tensions here resemble those
existing between judicial and private adjudication. In one important re-
spect, however, they are heightened in the case of the NLRB's deferral
policy. A fundamental feature of the NLRA is to confer upon the Board
a status akin to that of a statutory ombudsman.15 4 Thus, employees, un-
ions, or employers who believe that they have been injured by an unfair
150. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. In Olin, the NLRB also returned to an earlier rule by
placing the burden upon the Board's General Counsel to demonstrate that deferral was not
necessary. Id. at 575.
151. See, e.g., Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 851-52 (Jenkins, member, dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Christensen, Labor Arbitration and Judicial Oversight, 19 STAN. L. REv.
671, 683 (1967).
153. "Being keenly aware of the limited resources of this Agency, we are not particularly
desirous of inviting any labor organization... to bypass their own procedures and to seek
adjudication by this Board of the innumerable individual disputes which are likely to arise in
the day-to-day relationship between employees and their immediate supervisors .. " United
Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 559 (quoting United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879 (1973)).
154. This status has been recognized by the federal courts:
[Tihe authors of the CSRA [Civil Service Reform Act] apparently expected the Spe-
cial Counsel to act as an ombudsman responsible for investigating and prosecuting
violations of the Act. The Special Counsel was modeled after the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) who performs an independent
prosecutorial role with respect to employment relations in the private sector. Fur-
thermore, the reports and debates concerning the CSRA are replete with characteri-
zations of the Special Counsel as a "prosecutor" or "watchdog" of merit system
abuses.
labor practice can, by filing a charge, entrust the handling of the case to
the Board thereafter. If a complaint issues on a charge, the Board's Gen-
eral Counsel will litigate the case before an administrative law judge, a
United States Court of Appeals and, if necessary, before the United
States Supreme Court-all without cost to the charging party. Although
charging parties are permitted formally to intervene in these proceedings,
they are not required to do so. Many unions, employers, or employees
will, in fact, refrain from intervening altogether, or do so only to a lim-
ited extent, because they cannot afford the financial costs of full-scale
intervention. 155
The Act's structure for processing unfair labor practice claims thus
illustrates that a major objective in Congress' policy establishing the
NLRB's enforcement role was to minimize the parties' costs in obtaining
definitive dispositions of their claims. However, the increased cost to the
parties of having these questions resolved by privately selected arbitra-
tors, which is the result of the Board's expansive deferral practice, seri-
ously frustrates that policy. Nor is this difficulty alleviated by the fact
that the parties are merely being required to resort to the mechanism
they had voluntarily selected for the resolution of disputes, for, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, their arbitration agreements are limited
to disputes arising under the contract, and not those arising under statu-
tory law for which Congress has provided a specialized dispute resolu-
tion mechanism implemented by public officials responsible to the public
and applying public norms.
The NLRB's policy of deferral to arbitration is particularly ironic
when viewed in light of the Supreme Court's frequent rulings that, be-
cause the NLRA gives the Board primary jurisdiction to entertain cases
alleging unfair labor practices, state courts and agencies, as well as fed-
eral courts, are normally pre-empted from deciding cases that would af-
fect the resolution of those charges. 156 The rationale for this pre-emption
is that Congress has devised a particular scheme of administration, sub-
stantive rules, and remedies governing unfair labor practices and, except
when the question implicates strong local interests or the question is
Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord Wren v.
Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
155. Although arbitration expenses are usually much lower than costs incurred in judicial
litigation, this is not always the case. Even when they are lower, arbitration costs can still be
extremely burdensome.
156. It has been held, for example, that state courts may not entertain certain tort suits
seeking damages against unions for acts that are arguably unfair labor practices. Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 293 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
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merely of peripheral concern to the NLRA, 157 tribunals other than the
NLRB are without jurisdiction to hear cases that will affect those mat-
ters. Yet, under the Board's deferral policy, privately selected arbitrators
are permited not only to decide the contractual disputes entrusted to
them, but effectively to determine public disputes under the NLRA. 158
To be sure, the LMRA expressly encourages arbitration of contrac-
tual grievance disputes. However, the NLRA provides that the Board's
power to prevent unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be estab-
lished by agreement, law, or otherwise." 159 To rely so heavily upon the
LMRA's policy of encouraging arbitration thus undermines the NLRA's
more fundamental policy conferring upon the Board the primary respon-
sibility for enforcing the Act's unfair labor practices prohibitions. More-
over, the manner in which the Board defers to arbitration represents an
even more serious erosion of the Board's responsibilities under the
NLRA. Under the standards set forth in Olin, the mere fact that an
arbitrated dispute and the alleged unfair labor practice involved "parallel
facts" raises a presumption that the arbitrator considered the unfair labor
practice question, though in reality the arbitrator may not have consid-
ered it at all.
Sensitivity to these concerns has always caused some members of
the NLRB to dissent from the Board's policy of deferring to arbitration,
whether the deferral is to an already rendered award or to a prospective
award. 160 Occasionally courts, too, will balk at aspects of the deferral
doctrine because of what strikes them as an abandonment of the NLRB's
157. See, eg., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977); Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1966); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonza-
les, 356 U.S. 617, 621-22 (1958).
158. "Employees' Section 7 rights are public rights charged to the Board's protection."
United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 563 (Zimmerman, member, dissenting) (emphasis
added).
159. N.L.R.A. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
160. Nowhere in the [National Labor Relations] Act itself, its legislative history, or
in its judicial interpretation is there authority for the proposition that the Federal
labor policy favoring arbitration requires or permits the Board to abstain from effec-
tuating the equally important Federal labor policy entrusted to the Board under Sec-
tion 10(a).
Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 579 (Zimmerman, member, dissenting); see United Technologies, 268
N.L.R.B. at 563 (Zimmerman, member, dissenting) ("Employees' Section 7 rights are public
rights charged to the Board's protection."); Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 853 (Jenkins, member,
dissenting) ("So far as Congress has expressed any view concerning the desirability of shutting
off access to the Board where arbitration is available, apart from the enactment of statutory
terms which prohibit it, the view of Congress has plainly been against denying access.").
January 1987]
statutory obligations. For example, in Taylor v. NLRB, 161 the Eleventh
Circuit rejected major components of the Olin doctrine. In the court's
view, "By presuming, until proven otherwise, that all arbitration pro-
ceedings confront and decide every possible unfair labor practice issue,
Olin Corp. gives away too much of the NLRB's responsibility under the
NLRA." 162
According to the Eleventh Circuit, Olin either overlooked or ig-
nored instances when contract and statutory issues may be factually par-
allel but involve distinct elements of proof and questions of relevance. It
further ignored the practical reality of many bipartite proceedings, in
which individual rights may be negotiated away in the interest of the
collective good. In the court's view, the Olin standard cannot satisfy the
first Spielberg requirement that the proceedings below appear to have
been fair and regular.1 63
The Board, however, is not bound to follow the Eleventh Circuit's
disposition of its Olin doctrine in other Circuits. Until the United States
Supreme Court rules on the question, the Board can continue to apply
the Olin deferral standards and seek to have them enforced in other fed-
eral appeals courts. 164
161. 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
162. Id. at 1521.
163. Id. at 1522. Elsewhere in its opinion, the court observed that the plaintiff in Taylor
"contends that factual parallelism does not always guarantee legal parallelism and sets forth
several instances in which Olin's factually parallel' test win result in inadequate or no litiga-
tion of the unfair labor practice issue." Id. at 1520. Those instances were:
(1) The facts relevant to establishing a contract violation may differ from those
facts relevant to unfair labor practice violations, although there may be some overlap.
Example: An arbitrator's finding of just cause for an employee's termination may
overlook a real underlying reason for discharge arising from some protected activity.
(2) The standard of review for a contract violation may differ from a Board
[standard] for an analogous unfair labor practice claim. Example: The amount of
allowable insubordination by an employee differs for Board and arbitral purposes.
(3) The interest of the union may be to establish a favorable interpretation of a
contract, not to protect an employee from a specific unfair labor practice. Example:
A group of cases may be resolved jointly on a compromise basis, despite the wishes of
one grievant to proceed with an unfair labor practice complaint.
(4) A bipartite grievance committee issues a decision denying a grievance but
giving no indication of whether, and if so what, evidence or issues were considered in
reaching that decision. Example: The majority of Teamster grievance committee
decisions do not include written explanations, as demonstrated in the decision to
deny Taylor's grievance.
Id. at 1520 n.5.
164. [Ihe Board does not consider itself bound by Court of Appeals' rejection of the
Board's perception of what "the law" is or should be as to a particular issue. If the
Board is strongly enough minded on the issue, it persists in the application of its own
point of view in subsequent cases, hoping to achieve approval by some other Courts
of Appeals, thus producing a conflict in decisions among the Courts of Appeals
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It is difficult to reconcile the Supreme Court's apparent approval of
NLRB deferral to arbitration 165 with the Court's refusal to adopt a defer-
ral policy in Title VII cases. The factors that argue against deferral in
Title VII cases-the difference between the statutory claim and the con-
tractual claim, the procedural and evidentiary shortcomings of the arbi-
tral process, congressional dsignation of an appropriate forum-also
exist in cases arising under the NLRA and related collective-bargaining
agreements. 166 While Mitsubishi has since held that private arbitrators
may resolve federal statutory questions, 167 that decision involved an arbi-
tration clause which contained wording broad enough to embrace an an-
titrust claim. By contrast, the typical arbitration clause in a collective-
bargaining agreement usually refers to disputes involving the interpreta-
tion or application of the agreement. Mitsubishi, therefore, would hardly
authorize labor arbitrators to dispose of federal statutory claims under
standard arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements.
When the NLRB defers to arbitration, it is the Board itself and, at
times, the federal courts which have interpreted the NLRA as permit-
ting, or even encouraging, this practice. As indicated above, in view of
the apparent conffict between the NLRA's express preference for arbitra-
tion and the NLRA's equally clear delegation of responsibility to the
NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices, it is far from clear that Congress
intended such a result. However, Congress' long-standing and persistent
failure to overrule the NLRB's deferral policies suggests that the contin-
uation of those policies meets with congressional approval, although not
necessarily in all respects.168
which may lead to an authoritative resolution by the Supreme Court upon a grant of
certiorari.
W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J. ANDERSEN & T. HEINsz, LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 273 (3d ed. 1986). The Olin standards were approved in Bakery,
Confectionary & Tobacco Workers Int'l Union Local 25 v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 812, 815-16
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
165. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1515 (1984) ("[T]o the extent that
the factual issues raised in an unfair labor practice action have been, or can be, addressed
through the grievance process, the Board may defer to that process." (citing Collyer Insulated
Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955))).
166. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55-57 (1974). In declining to
adopt a deferral rule for Title VII claims involving facts that had been the subject of arbitra-
tion under a collective-bargaining agreement, the Gardner-Denver Court noted that such a rule
would be "analogous to the NLRB's policy of deferring to arbitral decisions on statutory issues
in certain cases." Id. at 56 n.17 (citing Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955));
see supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
167. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985);
see supra text accompanying notes 76-90.
168. The Board's decisions in United Technologies and Olin are too recent for congres-
sional inaction to be intepreted as approval.
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Measured against Professor Fiss' concerns, however, public officials
(i.e., democratically elected members of Congress) are ultimately respon-
sible for what can be described as a preference for an informal, alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanism over the more formal administrative-
judicial process they themselves have created for the vindication of cer-
tain statutory rights. Even if final responsibility for these policies could
not be laid at the feet of the legislature, the fact remains that members of
the NLRB are, to use Professor Fiss' language, "not strangers chosen by
the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the public
participates." Whenever the NLRB confronts a deferral issue, the par-
ties are, by definition, in dispute over whether it is appropriate for the
agency to defer to arbitration. In ordering-or in refusing to order-
deferral, the agency, in a sense, does exactly what Professor Fiss expects
of public officials: it explicates and gives force to the values embodied in
an authoritative text, a statute.
At the same time, when the agency defers to arbitration, it relegates
to persons who are not public officials the resolution of the underlying
disputes which brought the parties to the agency in the first place. As we
have seen, strong public policy reasons exist for the agency to decide the
underlying disputes: its greater familiarity with the statutory provisions;
avoidance of arbitration's informality and other shortcomings; the lower
cost to the charging party resulting from the agency's role as a statutory
ombudsman; and the danger under Olin that arbitrators who never really
considered unfair labor practice issues can effectively preclude parties
from having them decided by the agency created by the legislature to do
SO.
At the same time, countervailing public policies argue for deferral.
The parties did, after all, voluntarily agree to arbitrate their disputes.
Further, because the agency operates under a limited budget, it cannot
process all cases over which it has statutory jurisdiction. 169 By deferring
to arbitration in certain cases, it can more adequately address nondefer-
rable cases, thereby serving public interests.170 Moreover, arbitration typ-
169. Historically, the Board has declined jurisdiction over certain employers because it has
considered the nature of their industries or the dollar volume of their activities to have only a
slight effect on interstate commerce. Before 1959, there was some doubt as to whether the
Board was authorized to exclude selected categories of employers from its jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Hotel Employees Union v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99, 99 (1958) (per curiam); Office Employ-
ees Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 320 (1957). However, the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, tit. VII, §§ 701-707, 73 Stat. 541 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.), which, among other things, amended the NLRA, conferred statutory ap-
proval on this practice as it existed at the time the Act was passed. NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1973).
170. Presumably, a solution to the problem of agencies' inadequate resources is for legisla-
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ically resolves disputes much more quickly than the cumbersome
procedures of the NLRA. 171 This speedier dispute resolution is clearly
within the public interest. In addition, it can be argued that, by virtue of
their experience, arbitrators have developed expertise in deciding
whether employees have been discharged for just cause, for example, or
whether a contractual provision allows an employer to take unilateral
action in certain areas.172
In sum, in this area as in others we have examined, the NLRB, like
the courts, weighs conflicting public interests and decides accordingly.
Whatever it decides, the Board will advance some public interests and
frustrate others. Administrative agencies, like courts, are undoubtedly
tures to grant them enough money to administer the laws with which they have been en-
trusted. However, even before the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings restrictions on federal spending,
2 U.S.C. §§ 901-907, 921, 922 (Supp. 1986), Congress had great difficulty satisfying the con-
flicting budgetary requirements of numerous federal programs.
171. "In Linden the time between filing the charge and the Board's ruling was about 41/2
years; in Wilder, about 6 I/2 years. The Board's experience indicates that the median time in a
contested case is 388 days." Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 306
(1974) (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 611 n.30 (1969)). To this must be
added the time that will be consumed in seeking an enforcement order from a federal appellate
court and, at times, further review in the United States Supreme Court.
172. This is one of the factors that led the Supreme Court to require judicial deferral to
arbitration in the "Steelworkers Trilogy": United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 599 (1960). Not all observers agree, however, that labor arbitrators are necessarily ex-
perts or that the labor arbitration process is inherently fair. See Hays, The Future of Labor
Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965). For views contrary to that of Judge Hays, see Aaron,
Book Review, 42 WASH. L. REv. 976 (1967) (reviewing P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A
DISSENTING VIEW (1966)); Wallen, Book Review, 81 HARv. L. REV. 507 (1967) (same).
An additional problem with the presumed expertise of arbitrators arises from the fact that
arbitrators are not required to give res judicata effect to an earlier award dealing with the same
or related issues involving the same parties. They can conclude, for example, that an earlier
determination was analytically unsound and, therefore, ignore it. Cf Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Local 420, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 718 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (A court
faced with inconsistent arbitration awards may select contract interpretation which most
closely conforms to parties' intent.). Indeed, it is not uncommon for courts to enforce incon-
sistent awards by concluding that neither award will be set aside because each draws its es-
sence from the collective agreement. Graphic Arts Int'l Union Local 97-B v. Haddon
Craftsmen, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1088, 1098-99 (M.D. Pa. 1979). Nevertheless, it is the usual
practice of labor arbitrators to find prior awards final and binding. See, e.g., Board of Educ., 73
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 310, 311 (1979); Todd Shipyards Corp., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 27, 28 (1976)
(Jones, Arb.). The role of stare decisis in arbitration also differs from its effect in judicial
dispute resolution. An arbitrator need not follow other arbitrators' interpretations of the same
contractual language in other contracts between other parties. Still, what might be called a
"common law" of arbitral contract interpretation has evolved. The development of this "com-
mon law" is facilitated by the publication of reasoned labor arbitration opinions and awards by
such organizations as the American Arbitration Association, the Bureau of National Affairs,
Commerce Clearing House, and Prentice-Hall Co.
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guided by their members' sincere appraisals of the relative force of the
competing public interests; however, their resolution of these conflicts is
probably influenced to a considerable extent by the political and jurispru-
dential predilections of those members. 173
VII. Compulsory Arbitration
Legislatures have often been much more direct in not only encour-
aging, but mandating, arbitration or other alternative procedures for
resolving particular types of disputes. Compulsory arbitration has long
existed, for example, for so-called minor disputes, Le., grievance disputes,
under the federal Railway Labor Act. 174 Under the Act, employers may
not engage in lockouts nor unions strike over grievance disputes, nor may
either resort to the courts to resolve such disputes, other than to seek
limited review of arbitration awards. 175 In recent years, state legislatures
have required arbitration in medical malpractice cases, while providing
for a judicial trial de novo at the behest of a party aggrieved by the arbi-
tral award. 176 In some states, lawmakers have imposed a general arbitra-
tion requirement for cases in which the amount in controversy is under a
certain sum, while providing a right to a judicial trial de novo subject to
conditions that tend to deter dissatisfied parties from availing themselves
of that right. 177 As of 1983, a similar requirement had been imposed on
an experimental basis in selected federal district courts. 178 Primarily be-
cause of the almost universal prohibition against public employee strikes,
173. Unlike adjudicatory bodies, which are at least expected to be nonideological when
performing their duties, the role of legislatures in the American governmental system is ac-
knowledged as political and ideological. Some states, in fact, have enacted legislation codify-
ing a deferral policy quite similar to that of the NLRB. For example, the California Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) is charged with enforcing the Educational Employment
Relations Act, and the Act specifically provides that "the board shall not... issue a complaint
against conduct also prohibited by the provisions of the agreement between the parties until
the grievance machinery of the agreement, if it exists and covers the matter at issue, has been
exhausted, either by settlement or by binding arbitration." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.5(a)
(West Supp. 1986). PERE has declared that this statute "essentially codifies the policy devel-
oped by the NLRB regarding deferral to arbitration proceedings and awards." Dry Creek
Teacher's Ass'n, PERB Order No. Ad-81a (July 21, 1980).
174. Railway Labor Act § 3, para. First, (i), (m), 45 U.S.C. § 153, para. First, (i), (m)
(1982).
175. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
176. See, e.g., Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 497, 424 N.E.2d 586, 595
(1981).
177. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.11, .20-.21 (West Supp. 1986).
178. See generally E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBI-
TRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (rev. ed. 1983). More recently, it has been
reported that "[s]ixteen states and ten federal district courts have authorized court-ordered
arbitration programs." Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
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arbitration of bargaining impasses, ie., interests disputes, between public
employee unions and the public entities with which they negotiate has
often been compelled by law.179
Professor Fiss has stated that "settlement ... should be neither en-
couraged or praised."18 0 It is clear that his objections to mandatory arbi-
tration and other types of compelled alternative dispute resolution
procedures 1 ' would be even stronger. In all instances of mandatory ar-
bitration, however, legislators, although not unmindful of political and
ideological considerations, have struck a balance between competing
public interests in enacting such procedures for particular types of
disputes.
A. Arbitration Under the Railway Labor Act
The alternatives to compulsory arbitration of grievance disputes in
the railroad (and airline) industries, 82 for example, are limited. They
consist of: (1) permitting unions or employees to sue employers to re-
dress alleged breaches of collective bargaining agreements; (2) permitting
unions to strike and employers to lockout when either alleges that the
other has breached a collective-bargaining agreement; or (3) allowing un-
ions and employers the choice of substituting arbitration for either or
both of the first two alternatives.
The latter model has been chosen for employers and unions that are
covered by the NLRA. Despite this freedom of choice, however, the vast
majority of collective-bargaining agreements in NLRA-covered enter-
prises provide for final and binding arbitration of grievance disputes. 83
HARV. L. REv. 668, 668 n.2 (1986) (citing Background and Status, DisPTE RESOLUTION F.,
Aug. 1985, at 4).
179. See Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local No. 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich.
229, 241, 231 N.W.2d 226, 228 (1975), and cases discussed therein.
180. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1075.
181. Aside from compelling arbitration, legislatures have also mandated a variety of other
alternative dispute resolution devices. California, for example, requires pretrial mediation of
child custody and visitation issues in marriage dissolution proceedings. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4607 (West Supp. 1986). Seattle compels factfinding when a houseboat owner contests an
increase in a moorage fee by a floating-home moorage owner. Jeffery v. Weintraub, 32 Wash.
App. 536, 538 n.2, 648 P.2d 914, 916 n.2 (1982). Many states compel factfinding when public
employee unions and public employers reach bargaining impasses. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT.
§§ 243.712(2)(b), .722 (1980).
182. Airlines have been covered under the Railway Labor Act since 1936.
183. "The grievance procedure is one of the most universal and important provisions in
the collective agreement. Virtually all (ninety-nine percent) of the 1,717 major contracts stud-
ied in a national survey included such a procedure ... [and] about ninety-four percent pro-
vided for the arbitration of grievances between the parties." R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T.
ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 762, 764 (5th ed. 1974) (citing BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTIcS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-1, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A similar result would probably occur in industries covered by the Rail-
way Labor Act if they were permitted this option. Congress has decided,
however, that the critical nature of the railroad and airline industries is
such that the nation should not risk the possibility of disruptive work
stoppages every time a union or employer believes that its collective-bar-
gaining agreement has been violated. If the parties did not voluntarily
choose binding arbitration, the potential frequency and impact of such
disputes, Congress believed, could cause overwhelming crises in the na-
tion's economic life. If, instead of resorting to economic warfare, the
parties litigated such contract disputes in the courts, existing judicial in-
stitutions could soon be seriously disrupted. 18 4
To be sure, the right to strike is a hallmark of a democratic soci-
ety.185 In the private sector, it is legislatively protected.186 There would,
nevertheless, appear to be at least tacit agreement with the observation of
Jean Jaur~s, the early French Socialist leader, that the strike is a neces-
sary but barbarous mode of struggle against society itself.187 The same
can no doubt be said of the lockout and other weapons of economic con-
flict. It is one thing to protect strikes, and perhaps lockouts,18 8 when
AGREEMENTS: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 1 (1964) and BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: AR-
BITRATION PROCEDURES 5 (1966)).
184. Thus, even under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1982), which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain suits for the enforcement
of collective-bargaining agreements between unions and employers covered by the Act, indi-
vidual employee suits to enforce an agreement will be dismissed if they are subject to arbitra-
tion and the union has not breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to arbitrate
those disputes, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1967), or in its prosecution of the griev-
ances in the arbitration hearing. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976).
See also Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955), in which the Supreme Court gave a restricted reading to § 301(a). This read-
ing was broadened in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957), and in
Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 263-64
(1962). In Westinghouse, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, defended the narrow con-
struction of § 301 in part by asserting that "Congress, at a time when its attention was directed
to congestion in the federal courts, particularly in the heavy industrial areas, [had not] in-
tended to open the doors of the federal courts to a potential flood of grievances ... ." 348 U.S.
at 460.
185. See Kanowitz, Book Review, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 150 (1982) (reviewing INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURES IN LABOUR DIS-
PUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1980)).
186. See, e.g., N.L.R.A. §§ 2(3), 13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 163 (1982).
187. See Kanowitz, The Strike and Lockout Under French Labor Law, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J.
211, 211 (1964).
188. The United States Supreme Court has held that, after a bargaining impasse has oc-
curred, an employer violates neither § 8(a)(1) nor § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by engaging in an
offensive lockout designed to pressure the union and employees to accept the employer's con-
tract terms. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965). Whether a pre-
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unions and employers seek to negotiate the terms of collective-bargaining
agreements. It is quite another to encourage the potentially interminable
social turmoil that could result if absolute protection were accorded to
these weapons when used to resolve problems of interpreting or applying
those agreements. Society can endure only so much struggle against
itself.
The sheer volume of such disputes militates against their judicial
resolution as well-especially when the grievance-arbitration process
has, despite admitted shortcomings, proved relatively satisfactory to em-
ployers, unions, employees, and the public. In addition, much can be
said for Professor David Feller's observation that "labor arbitration is
really the adjudicatory phase of a system of government," and his further
suggestion that judicial deference to arbitration really reflects the treat-
ment of "that system of government as another jurisdiction, to whose
judgments [the courts] must give full faith and credit when there was
jurisdiction to enter those judgments." 189
Weighing against these considerations is the fact that, to employ
Judge Story's 1845 description of commercial arbitration, 190 labor arbi-
tration retains many of the elements of rusticum judicium. 1 91 Also, the
presence of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement
will normally deter individual employees from pursuing their own claims
in the courts. 192 Only when a union has violated its "duty of fair repre-
sentation" in processing an employee's contract-based grievance will the
employee be able to pursue a judicial remedy against an employer for the
alleged contract violation. 193 Because a union's burden to show that it
did not violate its fair-representation duty is modest,194 employees will
rarely be permitted to sue their employers for breach of collective-bar-
gaining agreements that contain arbitration provisions. When one adds
impasse bargaining lockout is permissible is unclear, although at least one federal appellate
court has treated both situations alike. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
189. Feller, supra note 120, at 105. Although different factors are present, such considera-
tions might also play a role in the NLRB's deferral policy. See supra note 172.
190. See supra text accompanying note 56.
191. See, eg., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 56-57 (1974).
192. Cf Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1967) (class action filed by discharged em-
ployee when union refused to arbitrate grievance).
193. Id.; see also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 54 (1976) (contractual griev-
ance dispute requirements may be waived when union breaches duty of fair representation).
194. The union is "limited only by the standard of arbitrariness." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 208 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Org., 420 U.S. 50, 74 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he burden on the employee
is heavy.").
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that, under the unique American labor law regime, employees may be
bound by a collective-bargaining agreement although they oppose repre-
sentation by the union that entered into it, or indeed by any union at all,
this result seems particularly harsh. That situation flows, however, from
a considered legislative decision that the exclusivity principle in labor
relations serves the public interest. 195
When the reasons for and against compulsory arbitration of griev-
ance disputes under the Railway Labor Act are weighed, Professor
Feller's observation that "labor arbitration is really the adjudicatory
phase of a system of government"'196 appears to recognize a principle that
would offset whatever public interest exists in contract interpretation by
"public officials," as well as the perceived or actual infirmities in the arbi-
tration process. Both the major railroad employers and the vast majority
of railroad unions supported the Railway Labor Act when it was origi-
nally passed by Congress, 9 7 and the widespread use of voluntary, bind-
ing grievance arbitration under the NLRA suggests that unions and
employers, as well as the public, have significant interests in avoiding
continuous resort to economic warfare or to the courts. Mandatory arbi-
tration of "minor" disputes in industries covered by the Railway Labor
Act appears to reflect a proper balancing of competing public interests.
B. Compulsory Medical Malpractice Arbitration
Medical malpractice is simply a species of tort. If a legislature pre-
scribed arbitration as the exclusive dispute-resolution mechanism for
such cases, it would collide with the constitutionally guaranteed right to
a jury trial.'9 While arbitration of medical malpractice claims is often
195. "Congress determined that it would promote peaceful labor relations to permit a
union and an employer to conclude an agreement requiring employees who obtain the benefit
of union representation to share its cost, and that legislative judgment was surely an allowable
one." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 219 (1977).
196. Feller, supra note 120, at 105.
197. As appears in the Railway Clerks opinion [Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Broth-
erhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 48 (1930)], the Railway Labor Act of 1926, a
seminal statute in the scheme of labor relations in the United States, was the product
of a broad consensus among railroads and railway brotherhoods. Indeed, it might be
characterized as an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement which was then
ratified by congressional action.
W. OBERER, K. HANSLOW, J. ANDERSEN & T. HEINSZ, supra note 165, at 106. The original
Act contained no mandatory arbitration requirement for "minor" disputes. That requirement
was added in the 1934 amendments to the Act "with the full concurrence of the national
railway labor organizations." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R.,
353 U.S. 30, 37 (1957).
198. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
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compelled by statute it is, therefore, not made exclusive. Dissatisfied par-
ties in a compelled medical malpractice arbitration are entitled to a trial
de novo in the regular courts. 199 If they pursue their claims in the courts,
however, the prior arbitration award is not a nullity. Despite traditional
rules excluding the judgments of other tribunals as hearsay and opinion,
it will be admitted as a form of expert's opinion. 2°°
What, then, are the competing public interests in compelled arbitra-
tion of medical malpractice claims? On the one hand are the concerns
expressed by Professor Fiss about the responsibility of public tribunals to
decide legal disputes, reinforced by the constitutional jury-trial guaran-
tee. On the other is the discerned medical malpractice "crisis."
Although opinions vary, many legislators worry that physicians will be
forced from practice or will engage in expensive and unnecessary precau-
tionary procedures as a result of ever-increasing jury awards in medical
malpractice cases and the consequent rise in insurance premiums. Legis-
latures and courts seek to resolve these public policy tensions by permit-
ting dissenting arbitrators' opinions to be received in evidence along with
those of majority arbitrators.
At first glance, Professor Fiss' preference for judicial dispute resolu-
tion over settlement and other forms of ADR would appear to be
honored, if not as a result of his policy arguments, then at least because
of constitutional considerations. The dispute will ultimately be disposed
of by a court, indeed by a jury. Upon further examination, however, it
would be an extraordinary jury that could ignore the influence of the
prior arbitral award. Whether the arbitral board was composed of true
experts or of lay persons, most juries would tend to regard the arbitration
panel as a type of court, which had already heard the evidence and ren-
dered its decision. 20 1
Because reducing the size of medical malpractice awards is a pri-
fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."
199. See, e.g., Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 497, 424 N.E.2d 586, 595
(1981), and cases cited therein.
200. Id.; see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
201. In Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E. 2d 586 (1981), the Ohio
Supreme Court stressed that the jury would be carefully instructed that the award was not
conclusive, that it was being received only as an "expert's opinion," and that the ultimate
decision on the merits was for the jury to make. In addition, the Ohio statute in that case
provided that the dissenting opinion of any of the arbitrators could also be received in evi-
dence. Despite these safeguards, there is much merit in the view of the dissenting judge in
Beatty that "[u]se of the panel's report as evidence impermissibly delegates the jury's fact
finding functions to a panel of arbitrators." Id. at 497, 424 N.E.2d at 595 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
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mary, if not always acknowledged, goal of compelling arbitration in such
cases, the jury is clearly intended to be greatly influenced, if not con-
trolled, by the arbitral award. The public policy identified by the legisla-
ture to support arbitration thus undermines a constitutionally identified
policy favoring jury resolution of certain disputes. Although the jury
right is not absolutely denied, a strong argument can be made that the
constitutional policy ought to be accorded greater weight-especially
when the countervailing policy does not implicate external concerns such
as the efficient use of judicial resources or the promotion of peaceful la-
bor-management relations but instead centers on a perceived deficiency
in the jury system itself. When the competing factors are weighed, the
case for mandatory arbitration in medical malpractice cases is less com-
pelling than it is in other areas. Once again, however, we see how the
extremely flexible, if not manipulable, technique of balancing is employed
in this area.
C. Judicial Arbitration
In judicial arbitration, or, as it has often been called, court-annexed
arbitration, the calculus of competing public interests differs somewhat.
Here, the goal of reducing the courts' caseload is paramount, although
legislators hope that arbitration's relative informality, speed, and inex-
pensiveness will also enhance party satisfaction in the dispute's ultimate
resolution. 20 2
Although mandatory judicial arbitration schemes differ in their par-
ticulars,20 3 the broad contours of the California statute2°4 are fairly typi-
cal. The California Judicial Council's 1983 Report and Recommendation
on Effectiveness of Judicial Arbitration20 5 describes the background and
operation of the statute as follows:
Effective July 1, 1979, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive
program for mandatory judicial arbitration in superior courts having
10 or more judges and in all other courts which elect through local rule
to make the program available .... Judicial Arbitration was also
provided in any case where the plaintiff elects or the parties stipulate to
202. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (West 1982) (legislative finding that "liti-
gation involving small civil claims has become so costly and complex... that courts are unable
to efficiently resolve the increased number of cases filed each year, and that the resulting delays
and expenses deny parties their right to a timely resolution of minor civil disputes").
203. In a 1983 article, Professor Leo Levin noted that "[c]urrently, court-mandated arbi-
tration is being used in nine states, the District of Columbia, and two United States district
courts." Levin, Court Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 539 (1982-83).
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10-.32 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
205. SUPER. CT. COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDI-
CIAL ARBITRATION 1983 (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter REPORT].
[Vol. 38
January 1987] ARBITRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 293
it. The act originally applied to cases which the court determined had
an amount-in-controversy of $15,000 or less and which did not require
equitable relief. The amount was raised to $25,000 for [designated]
counties .... The $25,000 limit also applies to any county where the
board of supervisors agrees to the increased limit ....
Since January 1, 1982, the law provides for the assignment of a
case to the arbitration hearing list within 90 days after a party declares
the case to be at issue .... After a case is placed on the arbitration
hearing list, either by court order, election of plaintiff, or stipulation of
the parties, an arbitration hearing is generally held within 90 days. A
neutral arbitrator-who is usually an attorney selected from a list
maintained by the court, but sometimes a retired judge-hears the evi-
dence and must make an award within 10 days after the conclusion of
the hearing. Any party wishing to reject the award must file a request
for trial de novo within 20 days after the award is filed with the court.
If the request is timely, the case is restored to the list of civil cases
awaiting trial and processed in the same manner as conventional cases.
A case which is eventually tried and results in a judgment that is not
more favorable than the arbitration award may subject the requesting
party to paying various costs and fees, such as the arbitrator's fee and
the expert witness costs of the other party.20 6
As in the area of mandatory arbitration of medical-malpractice
cases, the availability of a trial de novo at the behest of a party wishing to
reject the award renders judicial or court-annexed arbitration constitu-
tional. In effect, this type of arbitration, though mandatory, is not bind-
ing. Because parties who do not improve their position in a trial de novo
must bear costs and fees, however, their willingness to seek such a trial is
significantly deterred. Whether this feature of the law deters more
strongly than the receipt in evidence of an arbitration panel's award in
mandatorily arbitrated medical malpractice claims can only be a matter
of conjecture without further data. However, the California Judicial
Council's report states that, as of 1983, the "statewide trial de novo rate
for cases placed on the arbitration hearing list appears to be 1.4 percent
(2.7 percent, excluding Los Angeles)," and that "since the beginning of
the program, dispositions by trial as a percentage of total dispositions
have declined dramatically for personal injury cases-the type most
likely to be judicially arbitrated. ' 20 7 Although the report cautions that
"no satisfactory means are available to rule out other independent causes
which may be implicated in this trend, ' 20 these figures suggest rather
strongly that the judicial arbitration scheme deflects numerous disputes
from the judicial system, and that a significant percentage of these re-
206. Id. at 1-2 (citations and footnotes omitted).
207. Id. at 24-25.
208. Id. at 25.
main deflected as a result of the potential penalty imposed on parties who
obtain, but do not improve their position in, a trial de novo.
In short, despite the theoretical "escape valve" of a trial de novo,
judicial arbitration is virtually obligatory under the California statute
and similar schemes. 20 9 As a result, this area presents most starkly the
issues posed by Professor Fiss. Is lightening the courts' caseloads a suffi-
cient justification for forcing the transfer of the decision-making respon-
sibility from courts to private adjudicators?
In answering that question, one must first acknowledge that,
although making court dockets more manageable may be a major goal in
requiring judicial arbitration, it is by no means the only one. In enacting
the judicial arbitration statute, the California Legislature expressed its
concern about the cost and complexity, as well as the delays, in litigating
minor claims. 210 By imposing a monetary limitation on claims subject to
judicial arbitration (either $15,000 or $25,000)211 the legislature indi-
cated its concern that these deficiencies in judicial adjudication most se-
verely affect people with modest claims. When a plaintiff hires counsel
on an hourly fee basis, for example, a significant portion of a judgment
may normally be consumed by attorney's fees. Even if one assumes that
an attorney who represents a plaintiff on a contingent fee basis will
charge the same amount regardless of whether the case is tried before a
judge or an arbitrator, the expense for attorney's fees that a prevailing
defendant is likely to incur would be much smaller if the case is resolved
in arbitration than in court.
Of course, this problem can be dealt with, as it is in England and
other countries, by assessing attorney's fees as part of the costs against a
losing party. At first glance, it would seem that, were that done, publicly
responsible officials would not be ousted of their jurisdiction to decide
legal questions concerning publicly promulgated norms-although the
209. In 1978, mandatory court-annexed arbitration went into effect on an experimental
basis for certain types of cases in three federal district courts: the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the District of Connecticut, and the Northern District of California. E. LIND & J.
SHAPARD, supra note 178, at 7. Of the three, only in the District of Connecticut did "no
prejudice [attach] to the demand for trial de novo." Id. By 1983, however, that district's
arbitration program had been terminated. See Levin, supra note 203, at 539 n.13.
210. "The legislature's declared purpose in creating judicial arbitration was to reduce the
cost, complexity, and increasing delay of litigating modest civil claims." REPORT, supra note
205, at 3; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (West 1982).
211. In the federal district courts that have adopted court-annexed arbitration, the juris-
dictional amount varies. "Cases subject to the rule are generally those involving personal in-
jury or contract actions, in which no more than $100,000 is demanded (the amount limit is
$50,000 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania)." E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 178, at
7-8.
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problems of delay and complexity in judicial proceedings, among others,
would remain. Were attorney's fees assessed against losing parties, how-
ever, it would have a chilling effect on parties' desires to seek judicial
vindication of their claims and defenses. The ante would be raised. Not
only would litigants run the risk of not prevailing on the merits, but they
would face the additional risk of having to finance their opponents' pros-
ecution of the case.212
The goal of making efficient use of finite judicial resources by divert-
ing some cases from the judicial system addresses significant public inter-
ests in its own right. The size of the judicial plant is simply not limitless.
Disputes cannot be allowed to fester. Even if one assumes that the re-
sults in settlement or other forms of ADR are less "just" than those
reached in a judicial proceeding-an assumption that may or may not be
warranted-there is virtue in terminating disputes, not only for the im-
mediate parties but for society in general as well. Finally, some studies
indicate that the principal effect of judicial arbitration is merely to speed
up the settlement process, but that the basic rate of settlement does not
appreciably differ from when disputants negotiate in the shadow of a
pending or imminent lawsuit.213 As noted throughout this Article, the
vast majority of suits are disposed of before trial. Judicial efficiency is
clearly enhanced when courts do not have to consider the pleadings and
pretrial motions of parties who will otherwise settle.
212. Cf Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985). In Marek the Court construed Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which provides that a party who rejects a settlement offer that is
more favorable than the judgment eventually obtained at trial must pay the other party's
"costs" incurred after the making of the offer. The Court held that a party who had rejected
an offer to settle a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit and then obtained a judgment less favorable than
the offer was precluded by Rule 68 from recovering attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
noted in dissent:
Congress intended for "private citizens ... to be able to assert their civil rights" and
for "those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws" not to be able "to proceed
with impunity." Accordingly, civil rights plaintiffs "'appear before the court
cloaked in a mantle of public interest' "; to promote the "vigorous enforcement of
modem civil rights legislation," Congress has directed that such "private attorneys
general" shall not "be deterred from bringing good faith actions to vindicate the
fundamental rights here involved." Yet requiring plaintiffs to make wholly unin-
formed decisions on settlement offers, at the risk of automatically losing all of their
post-offer fees no matter what the circumstances and notwithstanding the "excellent"
results they might achieve after the full picture emerges, will work just such a deter-
rent effect.
Id. at 3029 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
213. "The results of the evaluation suggest that more expeditious settlement has been
achieved, while frequent termination by acceptance of an award has not." E. LIND & J.
SHAPARD, supra note 178, at xii.
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The policies of increasing court efficiency and creating an affordable
forum for litigants with claims of modest value thus significantly support
the institution of judicial arbitration. Although this practice effectively
limits the availability of jury trials for certain cases, arbitration under
schemes such as California's does not overtly seek to undermine the con-
stitutional policy favoring jury trials. At a trial de novo, a jury will de-
cide the issues without being influenced by an arbitrator's findings. It
would appear, therefore, that the move toward judicial arbitration has
struck a proper balance between competing public interests. At the same
time, legislatures and courts must be ever mindful of the warning flag
raised by Professor Fiss. The balance is a delicate one, and slight factors
can tip the scales in one direction or another. The important point is that
this form of mandatory arbitration, as well as any other alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism, must be subject to rigid scrutiny. We cannot
simply assume that, because the judicial system has its faults, an alterna-
tive device is necessarily superior.214
VIII. Public Sector "Interests" Disputes
Mandatory arbitration of bargaining impasses between unions and
employers in the public sector is designed to resolve "interests" rather
than "rights" disputes.215 This area would thus appear to be unrelated to
Professor Fiss' preference for judicial adjudication over settlement and
other forms of ADR, since disagreements over the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement are beyond judicial competence. An examination
of the cases dealing with mandatory public-sector arbitration, however,
reveals that courts have had to grapple with questions not unlike those
identified by Professor Fiss in Against Settlement.
Perhaps the most thorough judicial examination of those questions
appears in Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local No. 412 v. City of Dear-
born,21 6 decided by the Michigan Supreme Court. In Dearborn, the
Michigan Legislature had provided for compulsory binding arbitration
by ad hoe tripartite arbitration panels as the final step in the bargaining
process between municipalities and their police and firefighters. Under
the statute, the municipality and the union were each to choose a "dele-
214. With regard to Professor Fiss' concerns about ADR, it can be argued that persons
appointed to a judicial arbitration panel have become, by virtue of that appointment, public
officials. If that argument prevailed, the decisions of court-annexed arbitrators could be re-
garded as satisfying the need for public accountability in dispute resolution. Cf Dearborn Fire
Fighters Union Local No. 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975),
discussed in Section VIII of this Article.
215. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
216. 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975).
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gate" to the arbitration panel. These two would then choose a neutral
third party who would serve as the panel's arbitrator/chairman. The
statute also provided that if the delegates chosen by the union and the
city failed to agree on a third party, "either of them may request the
chairman of the state labor mediation board to appoint the
arbitrator." 217
The city of Dearborn had reached an impasse in negotiating new
labor agreements with unions representing its police and firefighters. The
unions then invoked arbitration, and each chose a delegate to its respec-
tive arbitration panel; however, the city's refusal to name a delegate to
either panel precluded selection of a third person to act as arbitrator/
chairman. Pursuant to the statute, the third person was appointed by the
chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission
(MERC). 218 The panels conducted hearings and rendered decisions, but
the city refused to comply with the awards. The unions then sought judi-
cial enforcement.
All four members of the court who participated in the decision
agreed that mandatory arbitration of interests disputes in the public sec-
tor was constitutional and desirable as an alternative to public employee
strikes, which are generally prohibited by law. They also agreed that the
statute would have presented no constitutional problem had it entrusted
the arbitration function to a state governmental panel of arbitrators. The
principal issue dividing the Dearborn court, however, was whether the
arbitration scheme devised by the legislature was an unconstitutional del-
egation of legislative power to private ad hoc arbitrators. Two members
of the court held that it was unconstitutional, but gave their ruling only
prospective effect. A third maintained that the statute was constitutional
in all respects. The fourth, Justice Williams, expressed severe doubts
about the statute's constitutionality had the unions and the public em-
ployer each selected their respective delegates and had the latter chosen
the third-party neutral arbitrator. He nevertheless concluded that the
Act was constitutional under the facts of the case.
Justice Levin, writing for the two members of the court who held
the statute unconstitutional, explained his conclusion as follows:
The arbitrator/chairman of the panel is entrusted with the authority to
decide major questions of public policy concerning the conditions of
public employment, the levels and standards of public services and the
allocation of public revenues. Those questions are legislative and polit-
ical, not judicial or quasi-judicial. The act is structured to insulate the
217. Id. at 242, 231 N.W.2d at 228 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.235 (1978)).
218. Id. at 241, 231 N.W.2d at 228.
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arbitrator/chairman's decision from review in the political process. It
is not intended that he be, nor is he in fact, accountable within the
political process for his decision. This is not consonant with the con-
stitutional exercise of political power in a representative democracy.
219
Elsewhere in his opinion, Justice Levin observed:
There are innumerable "disputes" difficult of resolution which
may become hot political issues-e.g., zoning, the location of public
buildings, school hours and school programs. These can all be viewed
as "disputes" or "differences" between the property owners, parents or
school teachers immediately affected and the government. It would be
an enormous departure from present concepts of responsible exercise
of governmental power if the practice were to develop of resolving dif-
ficult political issues in an arbitrator's conference room as an alterna-
tive to facing up to vexing problems in the halls of state and local
legislatures.
Reposing power to resolve political issues in a person called an
arbitrator and characterizing the issue a "dispute" or "difference" and
his decision an "adjudication" does not obviate the need for political
accountability of the manner in which political issues are resolved.
220
It is significant that, following the decision in Dearborn, the Michi-
gan Legislature enacted a new law prescribing compulsory arbitration of
interests disputes involving police and firefighters. 22 1 Under the new
statute, such arbitration must be conducted by a governmental panel
rather than by ad hoc independent arbitrators. This new scheme would
appear to meet the concerns expressed by three of the four Michigan
Supreme Court Justices who participated in Dearborn.222 It would also
appear to meet the underlying philosophical objections of Professor Fiss
to settlement and ADR, for, although Dearborn dealt with whether a
delegation of legislative power violated a state constitution, the concerns
expressed in Justice Levin's opinion resemble to a remarkable degree
those voiced in Professor Fiss' general criticism of settlement and ADR.
To be sure, Professor Fiss is troubled by the possibility that publicly re-
sponsible judges will be displaced by private parties in the elaboration of
legal doctrine. By contrast, Justice Levin is concerned that politically
unaccountable arbitrators will replace the legislature in the promulgation
of legal norms. The common thread that runs through their concerns,
219. Id. at 241-42, 231 N.W.2d at 228.
220. Id. at 267, 231 N.W.2d at 240.
221. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 423.235 (1978); 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 84, § 1.
222. Although Justice Williams in his dissent questioned the statute's constitutionality for
reasons similar to those expressed in the opinion of the court, he would have upheld the statute
as applied because the neutral arbitrator had been appointed by the chairman of the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission. Dearborn, 394 Mich. at 323, 231 N.W.2d at 267 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 231-33.
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however, is the notion that public issues should be decided by public
officials who are responsible to the public.
Other courts that have had occasion to consider the constitutional-
ity of similar statutes have not shown similar sensitivity to the concerns
identified by Professor Fiss and the Michigan Supreme Court. In City of
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Association,223 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court characterized the three members of the party-designated
arbitration panel as public officials who performed a public function, pri-
marily because they enjoyed the legislative "power to fix the salaries of
public employees . . . without control or supervision from any supe-
rior. '224 The court concluded that there had been no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to private persons. In Dearborn, Justice
Levin rightly criticized such "nominalistic reasoning," which, in his
view, "both begs the question and reduces the analysis of the issue to a
reason-free debate over labels. Such reasoning could countenance the
syllogism that all enactments of the Legislature are constitutional be-
cause the Legislature cannot pass an unconstitutional law."'225
The Wyoming Supreme Court offered other rationalizations when it
upheld a similar statute in State v. City of Laramie.226 Those were: (1)
that arbitration concerning public employees does not differ from that in
business and industrial affairs and therefore cannot be considered a mu-
nicipal function; and (2) that arbitration panels do not make law, but
only execute it.227 The first reason, however, ignores the potential impact
upon taxpayers of interest arbitration awards in the public sector. The
second overlooks the precedential effect of an initial award upon negoti-
ated and arbitrated settlements in other parts of the public sector within
the state.
Perhaps the most convincing rationale-aside from those found in
decisions based on specifically local grounds228-was advanced by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in City of Biddeford v. Biddeford
Teachers Association.2 29 There the court concluded that governmental
employees who are aggrieved should not have to look only to govern-
223. 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969).
224. Id. at 116, 256 A.2d at 210.
225. Dearborn, 394 Mich. at 249, 231 N.W.2d at 232.
226. 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
227. Id. at 300-01.
228. See, eg., School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb.
772, 774, 199 N.W.2d 752, 755 (1972); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 190, 255 A.2d 560, 562
(1969).
229. 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973).
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ment for redress. 230 Despite the force of this argument, it ignores the
problem of public accountability.
In my opinion, the most satisfactory treatment of Dearborn-type ar-
bitration is found in Justice Williams' Dearborn dissent, which accom-
plished a pragmatic balancing of the competing public policies presented
by an effective arbitration scheme that encroached on the legislative do-
main. Justice Williams observed that, no matter how it was phrased, the
central question in such a case was "what the people can or cannot give
away," and the people could not give away "public responsibility and
accountability in the management of [their] business, whatever the man-
agers are called. '231
The arbitration method at issue in Dearborn, according to Justice
Williams, retained sufficient public accountability because (1) the chair-
man of the arbitration panel had been selected by the Michigan Public
Employment Relations Commission, a publicly accountable body; (2) the
arbitration was conducted pursuant to extensive statutory standards and
could be subjected to judicial review at the request of a party; (3) com-
munity interest in the dispute was likely to place the arbitration panel
under public scrutiny, making the arbitrators publicly accountable to
some extent; and (4) the powers exercised by the arbitrators were limited
and well defined.232
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Williams relied heavily on the
observation of Professor Frank Cooper in his treatise State Administra-
tive Law that courts "weighing the advantage of delegation against the
hazards involved make a pragmatic judgment as to whether the constitu-
tional protections have been observed. '233 As discussed in the following
section, this pragmatic balancing technique is equally appropriate in as-
sessing the desirability of other ADR devices.
IX. The Meaning of the Arbitration Experience for Public
Interest Questions in Alternative Dispute Resolution
Professor Fiss' criticism of settlement and ADR is based on policy,
230. Id. at 403.
231. Dearborn, 394 Mich. at 323, 231 N.W.2d at 267 (Williams, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 314-15, 231 N.W.2d at 263. These factors corresponded to four criteria that
Justice Williams concluded were generally einployed by courts evaluating similar arbitration
schemes. Those criteria were: "(1) Proximity of those performing the delegated duty to the
elective process; (2) Sufficiency of standards of delegation and judicial review; (3) Length of
tenure and character of job; and (4) Kind of power delegated." Id. at 312-13, 231 N.W.2d at
262.
233. Id. at 312, 231 N.W.2d at 262 (quoting 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
53 (1965)).
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rather than constitutional, considerations. In all the arbitration cases we
have examined, courts and administrative bodies have made pragmatic
attempts to balance competing public policy concerns when deciding
whether to permit particular issues to be arbitrated, whether a legislature
properly subjected certain types of disputes to mandatory arbitration,
and the effect to be given an arbitral award in a subsequent judicial or
administrative proceeding.
This type of balancing is equally appropriate, if not inevitable, in
evaluating all alternative dispute resolution devices. The courts have not
been unmindful, for example, of the special problems of settlements in
class action suits mentioned by Professor Fiss in Against Settlement.234
Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court
will not approve a class action settlement unless it is fair, adequate, and
reasonable.235 Courts have insisted that in assessing the adequacy of a
settlement, the underlying dispute will not be adjudicated, for the "very
purpose of compromise is to avoid the delay and expense of such a
trial. '236 Nevertheless, in assessing a settlement, the court's evaluation
of the plaintiff's chance of succeeding on the merits plays a significant
role in determining whether the court will approve the proposed settle-
ment. Although this consideration does not take the form of a full-
fledged trial, the settlement is subjected to close judicial scrutiny. The
process, therefore, significantly involves public officials in the dispute's
ultimate resolution.
In the area of antitrust law, the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act (APPA)237 requires a federal district court to determine that a con-
sent judgment, which has characteristics of both a settlement agreement
and a judicial decree, is in the public interest before it may be entered. 238
This statute also sets forth guidelines to aid a court in deciding whether
to enter a consent judgment in an antitrust action.239
234. Fiss, supra note 2, at 1081-82.
235. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
236. Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971).
237. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982).
239. These considerations are:
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged viola-
tions, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, antici-
pated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other
considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including con-
sideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the
issues at trial.
Notwithstanding these guidelines, the function of the courts in pass-
ing upon antitrust consent judgments has been extremely limited. As
described by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bechtel Corp. :240
The court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that
the government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a particu-
lar decree is the one that will best serve society, but whether the settle-
ment is "within the reaches of the public interest." 241
If, instead of approving a consent decree, the court had issued a
decree after a trial, could it not have devised a remedy that would "best
serve society"? Indeed, would it not have been obligated to do so? The
courts' limited role in reviewing consent judgments under the APPA
thus underscores Professor Fiss' major argument. Although public offi-
cials-courts-are involved in the process, the shaping of the relief is
largely dictated by the parties rather than by these public officials who
subject the terms of the consent decree only to limited scrutiny. More-
over, by allowing settlement the courts forego an opportunity to interpret
the antitrust laws, or at least to apply those laws with full judicial
authority.
Once again, however, one can discern offsetting pragmatic consider-
ations that arguably justify this procedure. For example, had the case
gone to trial, the government might have lost. In that event, not only
would the relief not have been shaped to "best serve society," but there
would have been no relief at all. Even if one assumes that the govern-
ment would have prevailed at trial, it operates with limited funds and is
confronted with an ever-mounting caseload. Freeing the government to
attend to other cases in which antitrust defendants are not disposed to
join a consent judgment would appear to benefit the public. From the
defendant's viewpoint, settlement is advantageous because there is no
guarantee that it would have prevailed at trial. Even if it had, the ex-
pense, the anxiety, and the distraction from its other activities would
have ultimately redounded to the detriment of the public in the form of
increased prices for the defendant's products or services.
X. Conclusion
Whether we examine the area of arbitration or other forms of alter-
native dispute resolution, we see that legislatures, courts, and administra-
Id. § 16(e)(1)-(2).
240. 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
241. Id. at 666 (quoting United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass.
1975)).
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tive agencies weigh a variety of pragmatic and policy considerations in
deciding whether to allow such devices in the first place, and how to
respond to them once they are invoked. On the basis of the experience in
the arbitration area, several things are clear about these devices: (1) as
indicated by their widespread use, they respond to a felt need on the part
of the public; (2) satisfying the interests of individual disputants can, at
the same time, satisfy broader public interests; and (3) quick and certain
resolution of disputes in ways that are acceptable to the parties can keep
the peace, a matter in which the entire public has a deep interest.
Despite these considerations, it is important that the dangers and
countervailing considerations surrounding these devices be calculated
before resorting to them. The most significant concern is the one identi-
fied by Professor Fiss, which the courts have also recognized in many of
the arbitration cases discussed in this Article: namely, the importance of
preserving the role of institutions that have been entrusted with the task
of promulgating and interpreting behavioral norms and which are ulti-
mately responsible to the public for the manner in which they discharge
those tasks. As we have seen, in balancing these factors the courts have
resorted to a variety of analytical techniques. A principal purpose of this
Article has been to identify and critically evaluate those techniques. It is
hoped that this will prove helpful in dealing with the fundamental ques-
tions raised by the alternative dispute resolution movement.
A final comment on Professor Fiss' Against Settlement article. De-
spite its title, it does not in my opinion advocate the abolition of settle-
ment or other alternative dispute resolution devices. By suggesting that
they should be "neither encouraged nor praised," Professor Fiss is
merely cautioning against their being exalted as the best way to resolve
disputes. He has hoisted a warning sign that reads: "Consider what you
are giving up before heading down this road." Although, as indicated
earlier, the courts have not been insensitive to the concerns expressed by
Professor Fiss, the legal profession and the public owe him a great debt
for having raised his objections so cogently, coherently, and eloquently.

